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ARTICLE
THE SUPPORT-OR-ADVOCACY CLAUSES
RichardPrimus* & Cameron O. Kistler**
Two little known clauses of a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute are
potentiallypowerful weaponsfor litigatorsseeking to protect the integrity of
federal elections. For the clauses to achieve their potential, however, the
courts will need to settle correctly a contested question of statutory
interpretation: do the clauses create substantive rights, or do they merely
create remedies for substantive rights specified elsewhere? The correct
answer is that the clauses create substantive rights.
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................

146

I. THE STATUTE ................................................................................ 151

A. The Origin: Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871..... 151
B. The FirstRecodification: The Revised Statutes of 1874.. 153
C. The Law Today: 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).............................. 155
II. THE CASE FOR A SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRUCTION ........................ 157
A. The Language and Structure of Section 2......................... 157
B. What Rights Would the Support-or-Advocacy Clauses

Remedy?.......................................................................... 160
1. Not First Amendment Rights ..................................... 160
2. Not the Right to Vote................................................. 162
C. Article I Versus the ReconstructionAmendments ............ 164
III. UNP ACKING EX PARTE YARBROUGH ............................................

169

A. Race and Reese................................................................. 170
B. A Tale of Two Statutes...................................................... 172
IV. SUPPORT-OR-ADVOCACY VERSUS EQUAL PROTECTION........... 176

A. 1871-1971: Harris, Collins, and Griffin ......................... 178
B. Equal Protection Language as Remedial Legislation ...... 181

* Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, The University of Michigan Law School. The
authors thank John Turquet Bravard, Ellen Katz, Virginia Neisler, Emily Minton-Mattson,

Anna Searle, Audrey Springer-Wilson, and Adam Wallstein.
** Counsel, Protect Democracy.

145

146

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

C. Novotny and Carpenters................................................... 183
D. The Shorthand .................................................................. 184
V.

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS .......................................... 189

CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 193
INTRODUCTION

Civil rights lawyers know 42 U.S.C. @ 1985(3) as the statutory provision
creating a cause of action for conspiracies to deny the equal protection of the
laws.l But @ 1985(3) also contains two mostly forgotten clauses that are
about to become better known. These two clauses aim to protect the integrity
of federal elections. They create causes of action for people who are
victimized by conspiracies to prevent citizens from supporting federal
political candidates or to injure citizens on account of their political
advocacy. 2
These "support-or-advocacy" clauses were enacted in 1871, and they were
all but forgotten during the twentieth century. 3 In the twenty-first century,
however, the rise of new threats to democratic elections has brought the
support-or-advocacy clauses back into view. Some lawyers have dusted off
the support-or-advocacy clauses as a way to respond to new forms of voter
intimidation. 4 The clauses have also been used by lawyers seeking to deter
the sorts of electoral interference that the Russian government and
WikiLeaks practiced during the 2016 presidential campaigns. 5
As
contemporary conditions raise new and potent threats to the integrity of
American elections, the support-or-advocacy clauses can be important tools
of redress.
For the clauses to play that role, however, the courts must settle a basic
question that has divided them so far. That question is whether the supportor-advocacy clauses create substantive legal rights, rather than merely
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ("If two or more persons . . conspire . . for the purpose of
depriving . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws . . the party
so ... deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages .... ").
2. See id. (" [I]f two or more persons conspire to prevent . . any citizen . . from giving
his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully
qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress ...
or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy . . . the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages .... ").
3. As of this writing, there may be as few as three reported cases since 1900 in which a
federal appellate court clearly adjudicated a question under the support-or-advocacy clauses.
See Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2004); Gill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. of
Mo., 906 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1990); Paynes v. Lee, 377 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1967). Many more

cases have been adjudicated under § 1985(3)'s clauses covering conspiracies to deny equal
protection, though even those clauses lay essentially dormant during the first half of the
twentieth century. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656 (1951) (describingthe statute's

equal protection clauses as having "long been dormant" until that time).
4. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens-Richmond Region Council 4614
v. Pub. Int. Legal Found. (LULAC), No. 18-CV-00423, 2018 WL 3848404 (E.D. Va. Aug. 13,

2018). One of the authors (Kistler) served as counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.
5. See generally Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652

(E.D. Va. 2019). Both authors served as counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.
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remedies for rights specified elsewhere. Some civil rights statutes are of the
former kind, and some are of the latter. For example, the prohibition on racial
discrimination in employment contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19646 ("Title VII") is substantive.7 When a plaintiff sues for race
discrimination under Title VII, she sues to vindicate a right that Title VII
itself created. In contrast, 42 U.S.C. @ 1983 is remedial.8 It provides a cause
of action for plaintiffs whose federal rights are violated, but it does not
determine the content of those rights. A plaintiff suing under @ 1983 must
allege a violation of his rights under some other source of federal law. 9 In
that scenario, it is the other federal law that creates substantive rights, and
@ 1983 is a vehicle for suits seeking relief.
In 2018 and 2019, two federal courts gave different answers to the question
of whether the support-or-advocacy clauses of @ 1985(3) are substantive or
remedial. According to the district court in League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Public Interest Legal Foundationlo (LULAC), the clauses are
substantive legislation. 1 1 On that view, any person injured by a conspiracy
to use intimidation to prevent them 12 from supporting a federal political
candidate can sue. But according to the district court in Cockrum v. Donald
J. Trumpfor President, Inc., 13 the support-or-advocacy clauses are remedial
only. 14 On that view, no plaintiff can maintain a suit under the support-oradvocacy clauses without showing that the conspiracy of which she
complains violated some right created by a different source of federal lawlike a First Amendment 15 speech right or a right to vote under the Fifteenth
Amendment. 16

6. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2000e-17.
7. See id. § 2000e-2(a).

8. See id. § 1983 (creating a cause of action for persons subjected, under color of law, to
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws").
9. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987) ("[I]f there is a state

deprivation of a 'right' secured by a federal statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of
action .... ").
10. No. 18-CV-00423, 2018 WL 3848404 (E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2018).
11. Id. at *6 ("[T]he Court finds that . . a claim under the 'support and advocacy' clause
of Section 1985(3) . . does not require allegations of a . . violation of a separate substantive
right."). The district court in Arizona Democratic Party v. Arizona Republican Party, No.
CV-16-03752-PHX, 2016 WL 8669978 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2016), also treated the clauses in

this way.
12. At the encouragement of the FordhamLaw Review, this Article uses the words "they,"
"them," and "their" as both singular and plural pronouns.
13. 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 2019).

14. Id. at 664 ("§ 1985(3) is purely remedial. Therefore, in order to plead a viable claim
[under the support-or-advocacy clauses], Plaintiffs must allege the violation of a substantive
constitutional right .... "). By coincidence, both cases were decided in the Eastern District of
Virginia. Neither case generated an appeal, so the law of that district remains divided.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. A right to vote under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) might
not qualify as supplying a necessary predicate right, because the VRA has its own detailed
remedial scheme. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375-76

(1979) (holding that § 1985(3) cannot be used as a vehicle for asserting statutory rights under
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The resolution of this issue is critical to the support-or-advocacy clauses'
capacity to deter unlawful interference with elections. If the clauses are
merely remedial, they add little to the universe of civil rights law. Plaintiffs
alleging violations of the First and Fifteenth Amendments can sue under
other remedial statutes like @ 1983. But if the support-or-advocacy clauses
are substantive, they offer separate and powerful weapons for defending the
integrity of elections. On the substantive reading, many attempts to prevent
citizens from participating in the democratic process are actionable even
though they do not come within the First or Fifteenth Amendments. And
unlike the Voting Rights Act of 196517 (VRA), the support-or-advocacy
clauses authorize suits for damages. 18 That potential remedy means that suits
under the support-or-advocacy clauses might deter interference with political
activity more effectively. It also means that support-or-advocacy litigants
might be more able than VRA litigants to defray the costs of litigation.
There is a reason why the question of how to read the support-or-advocacy
clauses is being posed now, after more than a century during which the
clauses lay largely dormant. The Reconstruction Congress originally enacted
the clauses in an attempt to protect democratic elections from white
supremacist violence in the post-Civil War South. 19 After Reconstruction
ended, the federal government backed away from that cause, 20 and the
When the federal
support-or-advocacy clauses faded into obscurity.
government recommitted to voting rights after World War II, a great deal of
litigation occurred under the Civil Rights Act of 195721 and the VRA, which
were designed to address a set of problems associated with Jim Crow
segregation. 22 But now, when new conditions are threatening elections in
ways that the VRA was not designed to address, some litigators have
discovered an older tool that is once again useful-provided, of course, that
it is understood as substantive legislation.
As this Article explains, the question of whether the support-or-advocacy
clauses are substantive or remedial has a legally correct answer. The clauses
are substantive. Before long, it will fall to the U.S. Supreme Court to
confront the question and, one hopes, give that correct answer. As of today,
there is only one federal circuit-the Eighth-that has squarely decided the
issue. 2 3 And unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit got it wrong, construing the

Title VII because Congress created a different remedial scheme for Title VII rights). Full
resolution of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
17. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
52 U.S.C.).
18. See Ben Cady & Tom Glazer, Voters Strike Back: Litigating Against Modern Voter
Intimidation, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 207-08 (2015).
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).

21. Pub L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
22. See generally Cady & Glazer, supra note 18.
23. See generally Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2004); Gill v. Farm Bureau
Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 906 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1990). Half a century ago in Paynes v. Lee
(Paynes II), 377 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a claim
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clauses as remedial only. 24 Now that two federal district courts have
confronted the issue in relatively high-profile cases and given opposite
answers, 25 it is only a matter of time before another circuit hears a supportor-advocacy case and decides it correctly. There will then be a split in
authority among the circuits on the meaning of a Reconstruction statuteindeed, a Reconstruction statute that could easily emerge as the subject of a
fair amount of litigation as public interest lawyers struggle with new
challenges to electoral integrity. Once the circuits split, the Supreme Court
will need to resolve the question. This Article explains why the right answer
is that the clauses are substantive.
The relevant legal terrain is unusually complicated-complicated enough
that an adequate analysis requires an Article the length of this one. 26 The
statute is long and it is mostly unfamiliar, even to people who work in civil
rights and election law. The statute is also old, and it has been codified in
three different ways during different historical periods, which increases the
challenges involved in parsing the cases decided under it. There is also a
nonobvious constitutional dimension to the problem: although the supportor-advocacy clauses were passed as part of a Reconstruction statute, they
were not passed under the Reconstruction Amendments, and the failure to
see this point will send the analysis off in the wrong directions. The three
sources of complexity just described all interact, such that it is hard to
understand any part of the puzzle clearly without thoroughly understanding
the entire picture at once.
But the fact that a legal issue is complicateddoes not always mean that the
question is close. This one is not. Once all parts of the puzzle are clearly in
view, it is easy to see that the support-or-advocacy clauses are substantive
legislation. That is good news given the important role the clauses can play
under current conditions. The project of this Article, therefore, is to take
under the support-or-advocacy clauses. The opinion below can be read as viewing the clauses
as vehicles for asserting a preexisting right to vote that is protected solely from state

interference. See Paynes v. Lee (Paynes1), 239 F. Supp. 1019, 1022-23 (E.D. La. 1965), rev'd
377 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1967). So Paynes II is likely best read as supporting the view that the

clauses are substantive and create an enforceable right against private interference with the
right to vote. See Paynes II, 377 F.2d at 63-64 ("The Fourteenth Amendment is only a
protection against the encroachment upon enumerated rights by or with the sanction of a State.
The interference with a Federally protected right to vote is something more and something
different. Moreover, it has had the specific attention of Congress which has provided a
specific remedy for interference by private individuals. By the sometimes called Ku Klux
Act, a Federal right was created to recover damages for interfering with Federal voting
rights .... "). But because the court in Paynes II was writing before the Eighth Circuit got the
issue wrong in Gill and Federer, it did not explicitly consider and reject the Eighth Circuit's
view.
24. See Federer, 363 F.3d at 758; Gill, 906 F.2d at 1270-71.
25. See Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 664 (E.D.
Va. 2019) (finding the clauses remedial); LULAC, No. 18-CV-00423, 2018 WL 3848404, at

*4-5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2018) (finding the clauses substantive).
26. Another analysis, written essentially at the same time as this one, contains a more
general treatment of the support-or-advocacy clauses, looking at several different legal issues
that might arise under the clauses rather than going as deeply into this one. See Note, The
Support or Advocacy Clause of § 1985(3), 133 HARv. L. REV 1382 (2020).
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some complicated material and lay it out systematically, thus enabling the
courts that will soon confront the issue to find their way through the thicket.
In Part I of this Article, we present the Reconstruction statute of which the
support-or-advocacy clauses were originally a part. We begin with the
statute's text as enacted. 27 Then, we trace the recodification of the supportor-advocacy clauses, from the Revised Statutes of 1874 to their current form
in 42 U.S.C. @ 1985.28 In Part II, we turn to the question of whether the
clauses are substantive or remedial. We show that the clauses' original
statutory context strongly supports a substantive construction. 29 We also
show that a remedial construction cannot be right because there are no
preexisting federal rights that Congress could have been trying to vindicate
with the clauses. 30
For reasons we explain, the clauses are not
comprehensible as a vehicle for protecting First Amendment rights. And if
the clauses protect the right to vote, they do not protect it in any way that
supports the conclusion that the clauses are only remedial rather than also
substantive.31 Part II ends by explaining that the support-or-advocacy
clauses are not legislation enacted under Congress's power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments-in which case it might make sense to think of
them as remedial-but rather under Congress's Article I power to protect
federal elections. 32 That power is a power to enact substantive legislation.
We next turn to showing why some courts have mistakenly concluded that
the support-or-advocacy clauses are merely remedial. The answer lies in
misreadings of Supreme Court opinions, so in Parts III and IV, we show how
some courts have gone wrong in reading the relevant case law. In Part III,
we unpack the Court's opinion in Ex parte Yarbrough,33 an 1884 decision
that one court recently misread as holding that the support-or-advocacy
clauses are vehicles for vindicating Fifteenth Amendment rights. 34 In fact,
Ex parte Yarbrough establishes that the clauses are substantive. 35 Then, in
Part IV, we show how some courts have misconstrued the support-oradvocacy clauses based on a misreading of twentieth-century Supreme Court
decisions adjudicating claims under other portions of @ 1985(3). In the
relevant cases, the Court described the portions of @ 1985(3) covering

27. See infra Part I.A.
28. See infra Parts LB-C.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. See infra Part II.B.
31. See infra Part II.B.

32. That power is rooted in Article I, Section 4 for congressional elections and in the
Necessary and Proper Clause for presidential elections. See infra Part IIC. More specifically,
the power as it pertains to presidential elections is rooted in what John Mikhail has usefully
termed the "third Necessary and Proper Clause," which authorizes Congress to make laws for
carrying into execution the powers vested in any branch or officer of the government of the
United States. See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045,
1047 (2014); see also infra Part II.C.
33. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
34. See Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 663-64
(E.D. Va. 2019).
35. See infra Part III.
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conspiracies to deny equal protection as remedial only. 36 Perhaps because
the equal protection portions of @ 1985(3) are familiar and the support-oradvocacy clauses are not, some courts have interpreted the Court's
pronouncements that the equal protection clauses are remedial as if they
applied to the support-or-advocacy clauses as well. 37 But as we show, that
inference makes sense of neither the case law nor the statute itself.38 The
equal protection clauses are one thing, and the support-or-advocacy clauses
are another. And although the equal protection clauses are remedial, the
support-or-advocacy clauses are substantive. Finally, in a brief Part V, we
explain why giving the support-or-advocacy clauses their proper substantive
meaning comports with appropriate conceptions of the role of federal courts
in federal elections.
I. THE STATUTE

The support-or-advocacy clauses have been recodified more than once
since their initial enactment. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the
recodifications have not changed the meaning of the statutory language. 39
Moreover, it is not necessary to trace the clauses through every twist and turn
of their recodification history to understand the law they embody. It is useful,
however, to understand the clauses in two of the forms they took prior to
appearing in 42 U.S.C. @ 1985(3). The first is their original form in the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, also called the Enforcement Act or the Ku Klux Klan
Act (the "Klan Act"). 40 The second is their recodified form in the Revised
Statutes of 1874. Accordingly, in this part, we situate the support-oradvocacy clauses in their original context, then in the Revised Statutes, and
then in their modern form in 42 U.S.C. @ 1985.
A. The Origin: Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
The statutory language that now constitutes the support-or-advocacy
clauses of @ 1985(3) was originally enacted as part of the Klan Act. As the
last alternative title suggests, Congress passed the Klan Act to try to address
the problem posed by white Southerners who used organized violence to
perpetuate white supremacy in the South during Reconstruction. One year
earlier, the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment had officially
disestablished race as a criterion for voting. 4 1 The Ku Klux Klan functioned
as a paramilitary organization with a mission of, among other things,

36. See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S.
825 (1983);
37. See
38. See
39. See

Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 336 (1979).
infra Part IV.D.
infra Parts IV.C-D.
Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983).

40. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 and 42 U.S.C.).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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preventing African Americans and their white Republican allies from gaining
political power in the South. 42
Section 1 of the Klan Act created a civil cause of action for persons whose
federal constitutional rights were abridged by state actors. 4 3 That section
survives today, with amendments, as 42 U.S.C. @ 1983. Section 2 of the Klan
Act was much longer. 44 It contained roughly two dozen clauses, 45 most of
which created both criminal and civil liability for persons who conspired to
interfere with federal governance. 46 Among other things, section 2 contained
the support-or-advocacy clauses, which covered conspiracies to injure
citizens on account of their support or advocacy for federal political
candidates. 47 Section 2 also covered conspiracies to overthrow the federal
government, to levy war against the United States, to prevent the execution
of federal law, to steal federal property, to impede the work of federal
officers, to interfere with witnesses in federal court proceedings, or to deprive
people of the equal protection of the laws. 48 Several clauses of the civil
liability portion of section 2, including the equal protection clauses and the
support-or-advocacy clauses, are now codified at 42 U.S.C. @ 1985.
As the statutory language reflects, sections 1 and 2 differed in a
fundamental respect. Like the modern @ 1983, the original section 1 was a
vehicle for asserting rights specified elsewhere. The statutory language
expressly limited section l's coverage to "the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States." 49
Section 2, by contrast, could not possibly be read as only providing a vehicle
for the vindication of constitutional rights specified elsewhere. One who
steals federal property does not violate anyone's constitutional rights, but any
person injured as a result of a conspiracy to steal federal property would have

42. According to perhaps the leading historian on Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan
physically attacked as many as 10 percent of all the African Americans who served as
delegates to the conventions drafting new constitutions for the former Confederate states in
1867-1868. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:

AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-

1877, at 426 (1988); see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 84 (2009).

43. § 1, 17 Stat. at 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983) ("That any person who,
under color of any law . . of any state, shall subject . . any person . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall . .
be liable to the party injured .... ").
44. See id. § 2, 17 Stat. at 13-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
45. It is hard to establish the precise number of clauses. Section 2 contained two long
sentences totaling roughly 800 words, and the statutory text did not number the clauses.
Deciding where one clause ends and another begins within each of the two long sentences
sometimes requires exercises of contestable judgment. For present purposes, nothing turns on
this indeterminacy.
46. See § 2, 17 Stat. at 13-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
47. Id. (covering conspiracies to use "force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any citizen
of the United States lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a lawful
manner towards [a candidate in a federal election], or to injure any such citizen in his person
or property on account of such support or advocacy").
48. Id.

49. Id. § 1, 17 Stat. at 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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an action under section 2. There is no constitutional right to be a federal
officer, but any person injured as a result of a conspiracy to deter someone
from acting as a federal officer would have an action under section 2. So,
section 2, unlike section 1, was not merely a vehicle for asserting preexisting
constitutional rights.
B. The FirstRecodification: The Revised Statutes of 1874

In 1874, with the intent of making federal law more transparent and better
organized, Congress approved a general recodification of existing federal
statutes. The resulting publication, called the Revised Statutes of the United
States, became for a time the standard source for identifying and citing
federal statutes, much as the U.S. Code is today. In the Revised Statutes, the
Klan Act's long section 2 was broken up into more manageable pieces, which
were then sorted into half a dozen different statutory sections. 50
The disaggregation occurred in two ways. The first was a function of the
Revised Statutes' general architecture, in which criminal laws were
systematically set apart from all others.51 That method of organization
required a significant change to the language of the Klan Act's section 2,
which created both civil and criminal liability using the same set of
substantive clauses. 52 In other words, the structure of section 2 had been
"Anyone who does A, or B, or C, or D, or E . .. shall be both civilly and
criminally liable." Accordingly, the language describing each civilly
actionable conspiracy was exactly the same as the language describing each
criminal conspiracy: each substantive sort of conspiracy was articulated just
one time, with two kinds of consequences attached. To make the recodified
law fit within a system where civil and criminal law were separate, the
Revised Statutes had to include most of the language of section 2 twice, once
with a civil liability clause attached and once with a criminal liability clause.
For civil liability purposes, the Revised Statutes codified most of the
substantive language of the Klan Act's section 2 at section 1980, with the
civil liability provision attached. 53 Then, for criminal liability purposes, the
Revised Statutes assigned the substantive clauses of the Klan Act's section 2
to six different and nonconsecutively numbered sections of the criminal
code.54 So, within this system, the substantive language of each support-oradvocacy clause appeared twice. As clauses creating civil liability, they
appeared in section 1980(3) of the Revised Statutes. As clauses specifying
crimes, they appeared in section 5520 of the Revised Statutes.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has made clear that this recodification
did not alter the meaning of the law. 55 But familiarity with this restructuring
50. See 24 Rev. Stat. § 1980; 70 Rev. Stat. §§ 5336, 5406-5507, 5518-5520.

51. Title 70 of the Revised Statutes was titled "Crimes," and all criminal statutes were
codified within that title. 70 Rev. Stat. §§ 5323-5330.
52. See ch. 22, 17 Stat. at 13-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and in

scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
53. See 24 Rev. Stat. § 1980.
54. See 70 Rev. Stat. §§ 5336, 5406-5507, 5518-5520.
55. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983).
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is crucial for understanding how early courts construed the relevant clauses
because most of the major cases were decided when the Revised Statutes
were in force. Rather than speaking of section 2 or of @ 1985(3) when
describing cases under the support-or-advocacy clauses, courts in the 1870s
and 1880s spoke of section 1980(3) and section 5520.56 Their constructions
of section 5520 are particularly helpful in understanding the distinctive
content of the support-or-advocacy clauses because in section 5520 the
support-or-advocacy clauses stood alone. Everywhere else-in section 2 of
the Klan Act, in section 1980 of the Revised Statutes, and in @ 1985 todaythe support-or-advocacy clauses are bundled with other clauses carrying
other legal meanings. That bundling sometimes muddies judicial analysis,
as explained below, making it hard for later readers to see when a court is
describing the support-or-advocacy clauses or something else. But section
5520 housed the support-or-advocacy clauses and nothing else. Courts
deciding cases under section 5520 accordingly gave clear indications of the
distinctive meanings of those clauses.
In 1894, at a time when the federal government lacked the appetite for
vigorous enforcement of the rights endangered by organizations like the Ku
Klux Klan, Congress repealed section 5520.57 Conspiracies to harm people
on account of their support or advocacy for candidates for political office
would no longer expose the conspirators to the risk of federal prosecution.
But Congress did not repeal the portion of section 1980 creating civil liability
for those same conspiracies. The substantive language of the support-oradvocacy clauses in section 1980 was, of course, exactly the same as the
substantive language of section 5520-the civil and criminal versions of the
clauses created by the Revised Statutes were both taken from the initial
language of the Klan Act, where civil and criminal liability attached to the
same original clauses. Nothing differentiated section 1980's support-oradvocacy clauses from section 5520, except for the difference between civil
suit and criminal prosecution. As a result, judicial interpretations of section
5520-except on matters of punishment-are equally valid as interpretations
of the support-or-advocacy clauses in their civil forms. 58 It is the same
statutory language, taken from a unified original source.

56. See, e.g., Ex parteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 654 (1884).
57. See Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, § 1, 28 Stat. 36, 37.

58. Except, of course, to the extent that principles of statutory construction like the rule
of lenity might require the language to be read more narrowly in the criminal context. But
that wrinkle need not detain us here. If such a factor were present-and it might not be-it
would argue for construing the language more broadly in the civil context than in the criminal.
As this Article shows, the support-or-advocacy clauses are substantive even when interpreted
as criminal statutes. Any broader construction would also yield the conclusion that the clauses
are substantive.
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C. The Law Today: 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
The modern U.S. Code (the "Code") dates from 1926.59 In its first edition,
what had been section 1980 of the Revised Statutes became 8 U.S.C. @ 47.
Then, in the 1952 edition of the Code, the provision was relabeled 42 U.S.C.
60
@ 1985 and so it has remained ever since.
Section 1985 has three subsections specifying actionable conspiracies and,
like the Klan Act's original section 2, a single liability clause applicable to
all of the covered conspiracies, albeit one that imposes only civil rather than
criminal liability. 6 1 All of the clauses of @ 1985 originally appeared
59. Charles S. Zinn, Revision of the United States Code, 51 LAW LIBR. J. 388, 389-90
(1958).

60. 42 U.S.C. § 1985. There has been one minor change in labeling since 1952. In the
1976 edition of the Code, the subsections of § 1985 were labeled (a), (b), and (c), rather than
(1), (2), and (3). The prior labeling, using numbers, was restored in the 1982 edition of the
code and has since remained stable.
61. The entire text of § 1985 is as follows:
(1) Preventing officer from performing duties
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or
place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof;
or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district,
or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him
in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his
office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so
as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties;
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from
attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account
of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or
indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his
person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully
assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more
persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating,
in any manner, the due course ofjustice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny
to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for
lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of
persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat,
any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in
a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person
as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the
United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
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somewhere in the Klan Act's section 2.62 And as was true of section 2,
@ 1985 mostly addresses conspiracies to interfere with the processes of
federal governance. Section 1985(1) covers conspiracies to interfere with
federal officers. 63 Section 1985(2) covers conspiracies to interfere with
federal judicial proceedings. 6 4 And @ 1985(3), in the support-or-advocacy
clauses, covers conspiracies to interfere with federal elections. 65
Section 1985(3) is not drafted for maximum clarity. Its four substantive
clauses and its complex liability clause are all written as part of a single
sentence that is more than 250 words long. Given this Article's project of
treating a complex statutory question comprehensively enough to make
matters clear, it seems wise to produce the full text of the subsection here:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, [1] for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; or [2] for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or
more persons conspire [3] to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy
in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully
qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a
Member of Congress of the United States; or [4] to injure any citizen in
person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators. 66

The third and fourth substantive clauses above are, of course, the supportor-advocacy clauses. The first and second clauses are @ 1985(3)'s equal
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
Id.
62. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1985, with ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13-14 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (covering conspiracies "to prevent, by force, intimidation, or
threat, any person from accepting or holding any office . . under the United States, or from
discharging any duties thereof . . or to injure him . . on account of his lawful discharge of
the duties of his office").
64. See id. § 1985(2) (covering conspiracies "to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat,
any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from
testifying").
65. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983) (describing the support-or-advocacy

clauses as aimed at "conspiracies that interfere with . .. the right to support candidates in
federal elections").
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
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protection clauses. Like everything else in @ 1985, those equal protection
clauses are taken from section 2 of the Klan Act. But their substance, which
pertains to equal protection rather than federal governance, differentiates
them from most of @ 1985 (and most of section 2). In the Supreme Court's
formulation, these equal protection clauses differ from most of @ 1985 in that
they cover "activity that is not institutionally linked to federal interests and
that is usually of primary state concern." 67
The problem of legal interpretation to which this Article is addressed arises
mostly from some later courts' failure to appreciate this difference between
most of @ 1985's clauses, which protect federal governance functions, and
@ 1985's equal protection clauses, which address a different concern. The
equal protection clauses are remedial legislation-they act as vehicles for the
assertion of rights specified elsewhere. In contrast, the clauses that protect
federal governance-including the support-or-advocacy clauses-are
independently substantive. That was true of the support-or-advocacy clauses
as originally enacted in section 2 of the Klan Act, and it was true of the
support-or-advocacy clauses when they existed as section 5520 of the
Revised Statutes. It remains true under @ 1985(3).
II. THE CASE FOR A SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRUCTION
A. The Language and Structure of Section 2
As noted above, one reason why some courts have regarded the supportor-advocacy clauses as remedial is that the equal protection clauses of
@ 1985(3) are remedial. If the first two clauses of @ 1985(3) are not
independently substantive, one might infer that the last two are also not
substantive.68
One problem with this line of reasoning, though, is that it is a mistake to
treat @ 1985(3) as a meaningful unit. As explained above, the combining of
the four substantive clauses that now appear in @ 1985(3) is a matter of
administrative happenstance.69 As enacted, those four clauses were four out
of twenty or so substantive clauses of section 2 of the Klan Act. Within that
larger set, the four clauses that now appear in @ 1985(3) did not comprise a
natural subunit. They did not even appear consecutively. 70
They are also addressed to different topics: some address equal protection
and others address federal elections. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
the support-or-advocacy clauses have more in common topically with the
portions of section 2 of the Klan Act that now appear at @ 1985(1) and at the

67. Kush, 460 U.S. at 725. This is true of the two equal protection clauses of § 1985(3)
and also of the equal protection clauses that close § 1985(2). Id.
68. See generally Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2004); Gill v. Farm Bureau
Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 906 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1990); Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 2019).
69. See supra Part I.B.
70. See ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13-14 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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start of @ 1985(2) than they have in common with the equal protection clauses
of @ 1985(3).71 Section 1985(1), the first clauses of @ 1985(2), and the
support-or-advocacy clauses of @ 1985(3) all protect federal governance
functions: federal officers in subsection 1, federal judicial proceedings in
subsection 2, and federal elections in subsection 3. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, the concern with conspiracies to deny equal protection is of
a different kind.72
To be sure, the brute fact that statutory recodification has grouped the four
clauses of @ 1985(3) together seems at first blush to suggest that the supportor-advocacy clauses are meaningfully grouped with the equal protection
clauses. But that reading cannot be valid if it would not make sense as an
interpretation of the original statute. If the legal force of the support-oradvocacy clauses depended on a fact about the recodification that was not
true of the initial statute, then the recodification would have changed the
meaning of the law. And the Supreme Court has made clear that
recodification did not change the meaning of section 2.73
It is not at all clear, therefore, why the support-or-advocacy clauses should
be interpreted to be like the equal protection clauses, rather than being
interpreted to be like the portions of @ 1985 with which they actually have
more in common. And if the support-or-advocacy clauses are read in light
of other @ 1985 clauses protecting federal governance, the natural inference
is that the clauses are independently substantive. As noted above, @ 1985(1)
creates a cause of action against people who conspire to prevent people from
holding federal office. 74 Apart from @ 1985, there is no right to be a federal
officer. Section 1985(1) therefore cannot be understood as merely creating
a cause of action to vindicate federal rights specified elsewhere. Similarly,
@ 1985(2) creates a cause of action against people who conspire to deter
witnesses from testifying in federal court. 75 Apart from @ 1985, there is no
federal right to testify in court, except of course in one's own case. So,
@ 1985 does not merely provide a remedy for vindicating rights specified by
other sources of law. In many of its clauses, @ 1985 is substantive legislation.
The point grows even stronger if we situate the support-or-advocacy
clauses in their original context. Just as there is no legal justification for
treating the clauses that are grouped together as @ 1985(3) as more of an
interpretive unit than @ 1985 as a whole, there is no legal justification for
treating the clauses that are grouped together as @ 1985 as more of an
interpretive unit than the larger group of clauses that made up section 2 of
the Klan Act. Congress created only the section 2 grouping; the others are
artifacts of administrative recodifications that did not change statutory
meaning. And it is not plausible to read section 2 as creating a series of
causes of action for vindicating rights specified elsewhere rather than as

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Kush, 460 U.S. at 725.
See id.
See id. at 724.
See supra Part I.C.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).
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substantive legislation. Section 2 prohibited conspiracies to destroy the
federal government, to levy war against the United States, and to steal federal
property. 76 Many bad things might flow from such conspiracies. But no
source of law outside section 2 created an individual right, held by private
persons, against other people's attempting to destroy the government, levy
war against it, or steal its property.
Indeed, the difference between a statute creating a cause of action to
vindicate rights specified elsewhere and a statute making substantive law is
one of the striking differences between the Klan Act's section 2 and the
immediately preceding section 1. Section 1 was expressly remedial. It
created a cause of action for persons subjected "to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States." 77
Section 2 contained no comparable language and for a
straightforward reason: as its substance indicates, section 2 contained
substantive legislation.
It does not follow that every clause of section 2, or every clause of section
1985, must be understood as substantive legislation. The equal protection
clauses of @ 1985(3) are not read that way 78 and for understandable reasons.
The language of the equal protection clauses does not describe any
freestanding or substantive legal rights that those clauses could be applied to
protect. Instead, those clauses cover conspiracies to deprive people of "the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws." 7 9 The entitlement so specified is to the equal enjoyment of whatever
legal rights people happen to have. Given that the text of the clauses refers
to other sources of law, it makes sense to read the equal protection clauses as
remedies for rights specified elsewhere. But within section 2 as a whole, the
equal protection clauses are outliers in this respect. Most of the other clauses
in
section
2
are
straightforwardly
understood-indeed,
only
comprehensible-as substantive legislation. Given that there is no tighter
connection between the support-or-advocacy clauses and the equal protection
clauses than there is between the support-or-advocacy clauses and the rest of
section 2, there is no reason to think that something true of only a small subset
of section 2's clauses must be true of the support-or-advocacy clauses.
Moreover, and like most of section 2 other than the equal protection
clauses, the text of the support-or-advocacy clauses is naturally understood
as substantive. The language of the clauses specifies everything necessary
to support a cause of action: a person who conspires to harm another on
account of support or advocacy given to a candidate for federal office is

Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), and United Brotherhood of Carpenters

&

&

76. ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13-14 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
77. Id. § 1, 17 Stat. at 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
78. See infra Part IV.C (describing the Supreme Court's decisions in Great Am. Sav.

Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), both of which hold that an allegation of a
denial of equal protection under § 1985(3) must allege the violation of a substantive right
created by a different source of law).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
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liable. 80 The clauses do not say that there is a cause of action when someone
is denied equal treatment under some other law. They say that there is a
cause of action when someone is injured as a result of a defined course of
conduct, namely a conspiracy to prevent support or advocacy for, or to harm
citizens on account of support or advocacy given to, candidates for federal
office.
B. What Rights Would the Support-or-Advocacy Clauses Remedy?

There is also a further problem with trying to read the support-or-advocacy
clauses as merely creating remedies for rights specified elsewhere: what
preexisting rights, exactly, could those clauses have been enacted to
vindicate? Modern courts construing the clauses as remedial have given two
answers. On one theory, the support-or-advocacy clauses can be vehicles for
asserting the rights of speech and advocacy protected by the First
Amendment. 81 On another, the support-or-advocacy clauses are vehicles for
protecting the right to vote. 82 But as we explain below, neither of these
approaches makes sense of the statute. And if it is not possible to identify
preexisting rights that the support-or-advocacy clauses might be meant to
vindicate, then it makes little sense to read those clauses as merely
vindicating preexisting rights-especially given that neither the statutory
language nor the original statutory context points in that direction.
1. Not First Amendment Rights
The intuition that the support-or-advocacy clauses could operate as
vehicles for asserting First Amendment rights is easy to understand. A
citizen's support or advocacy for a political candidate is a form of political
expression, and the right to engage in political expression is a right associated
with the First Amendment. 83 But upon even a moment's reflection, the idea
that Congress enacted the support-or-advocacy clauses to give citizens
vehicles for asserting First Amendment rights collapses. Congress enacted
the support-or-advocacy clauses in 1871 as part of a statute intended to fight
the Ku Klux Klan's campaign to maintain white supremacy and impede
federal governance. Congress's effort entailed increased protection for
Americans in the South who wanted to promote political agendas that the
Klan opposed. 84 But a cause of action to vindicate First Amendment rights
would not have been any part of such an effort because in 1871, rights under
80. To be sure, there is a trivial sense in which even that language cannot be
operationalized without reference to other statutes. Some other source of law is needed in
order to determine, for example, what a federal office is and who is a candidate for it. But
those other sources of law are not the source of the right that the support-or-advocacy clauses
create causes of action to vindicate.
81. See Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 2004); Gill v. Farm Bureau Life

Ins. Co. of Mo., 906 F.2d 1265, 1270 (8th Cir. 1990).
82. See Gill, 906 F.2d at 1270; Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 3d 652, 663-64 (E.D. Va. 2019).
83. See Gill, 906 F.3d at 1270 (articulating this line of thought).
84. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the First Amendment could be asserted only against the federal
government. 85
The Reconstruction Congress was not concerned that Americans interested
in advocating the election of candidates for federal office needed protection
against the federal government.

The worry was that pro-Reconstruction

activists, in particular, Republican Party activists, both Black and white, were
being threatened by local actors and mostly by nonstate actors like the Klan. 86
If a person harmed on account of their political advocacy could state a claim
under the support-or-advocacy clauses only if the harm amounted to a
violation of the First Amendment, then those clauses would have been of no
use to citizens who, in 1872, were beaten by Klansmen for advocating the
election of Republicans. Even today, plaintiffs have no First Amendment
claim when nonstate actors interfere with their political advocacy. 87 Whether
the Klan itself was at times tantamount to a state actor is a subtle question.88
But even if it were, it would have been a state actor and not a federal one,
and First Amendment rights ran only against the federal government until
well into the twentieth century. 89 So, in sum, construing the support-oradvocacy clauses as vehicles for asserting First Amendment rights would
mean that those clauses had no application to cases involving Klan violence
in the 1870s. An interpretation of the Klan Act on which the support-oradvocacy clauses do not reach Klan violence against 1870's Republican
Party activists cannot be right.
Not surprisingly, nineteenth-century courts recognized that the support-oradvocacy clauses had force even in the absence of First Amendment
violations. Those courts imposed liability under the support-or-advocacy
clauses against private actors 90 and, as noted earlier, private actors cannot
violate First Amendment rights.91 In sum, it is clearly possible to state a valid

85. See generally Strombergv. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (holding, for the first time,

that the First Amendment's right of free speech is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus applicable to state actors).
86. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 42; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (stating that the First

Amendment is not triggered in the absence of state action).
88. Cf Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951) (describing the Ku Klux Klan as

powerful enough, at certain times and for some purposes, to be much like a state actor).
89. See RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 68-70 (1999)

(analyzing the application of First Amendment rights against state governments as a twentiethcentury

innovation).

See generally GERARD M. MAGLIOCCA,

THE HEART OF THE

CONSTITUTION: How THE BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2017) (describing this

process).
90. See generally Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (concerning the prosecution

of private parties under 70 Rev. Stat. § 5520); United States v. Goldman, 25 F. Cas. 1350,
1352 (C.C.D. La. 1878) (No. 15,225) (concerning a similar situation).
91. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019) ("[W]hen

a private entity provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily constrained by
the First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor."); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has

no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))); Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) ("The First
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claim under the support-or-advocacy clauses without a predicate right under
the First Amendment, and there is no reason to think that the clauses were
designed to vindicate First Amendment rights at all.
2. Not the Right to Vote
Given the connection between political advocacy and voting, it is also easy
to understand the intuition that the support-or-advocacy clauses might be
vehicles for vindicating the right to vote. Without question, it is possible to
imagine cases in which the same conduct would violate the right to vote and
also give rise to a cause of action under the support-or-advocacy clauses. A
vote in favor of a candidate is a form of support for that candidate, so a
conspiracy to prevent a citizen from voting in a federal election could be
actionable under the support-or-advocacy clauses. 92 But the fact that a
conspiracy to deny the right to vote can give rise to a support-or-advocacy
claim does not mean that the support-or-advocacy clauses are merely
vehicles for asserting claims based on the right to vote. The language of the
statute, the statutory context, and the case law all indicate that the supportor-advocacy clauses protect something broader.
Consider the statutory language first. The support-or-advocacy clauses
cover conspiracies to prevent "any citizen of the United States lawfully
entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy . .. in favor of'
candidates for federal office. 9 3 If Congress had meant to create a remedy for
violations of the right to vote, it could have written a statute proscribing
conspiracies to prevent "any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote from
voting" or "from exercising his right to vote." But that is not what Congress
wrote in the support-or-advocacy clauses. Congress wrote these clauses
more broadly, to reach supportand advocacy for candidates, rather than only
voting.94

and Fourteenth Amendments are limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of
private property used only for private purposes."); Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2019) ("No one disputes that the First Amendment

restricts government regulation of private speech but does not regulate purely private
speech.").
92. We use the language "could be actionable," rather than "would be actionable" because
a claim under the support-or-advocacy clauses arising from a conspiracy to prevent a citizen
from giving support or advocacy in favor of a candidate for political office must show that the
defendants conspired to achieve their aim "by force, intimidation or threat." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3). Not every conspiracy to deny the right to vote satisfies this requirement.
93. Id.

94. To judge by the current version of § 1985(3), there would also seem to be a second
reason of this kind for thinking that the statute was written more broadly than a statute aimed
specifically at protecting the right to vote would have been written. In the current version, the
second support-or-advocacy clause-that is, the fourth clause of § 1985(3)-covers
conspiracies "to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or
advocacy." Id. The language "any citizen" in this clause contrasts with the language "any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote" in the previous clause, suggesting that the statute
protects both the political activity of citizens eligible to vote (in the third clause) and citizens
who are not eligible to vote (in the fourth clause). A statute that protects the advocacy of
nonvoters is not easily understood as a statute aimed at protecting the right to vote in particular
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Indeed, the Reconstruction Congress had already enacted a statute
protecting the right to vote one year before it enacted the support-oradvocacy clauses. The Civil Rights Act of 1870, also called the Enforcement
Act of 1870, was formally titled "An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of
the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other
Section 4 of the 1870
Purposes" (the "1870 Enforcement Act"). 95
Enforcement Act established both civil and criminal liability for people who
conspired "to hinder, delay, prevent, or obstruct, any citizen from doing any
act required to be done to qualify him to vote or from voting at any
election." 96
Given that Congress in 1870 chose language protecting voting in particular
but in 1871 chose language referring to support and advocacy, it makes little
sense to read the clauses enacted in 1871 as vehicles for asserting a predicate
right to vote: First, clearly Congress knew how to write a statute specifically
aimed at protecting the right to vote if it wanted to. Second, a cause of action
for violations of the right to vote in the 1871 Klan Act would have been
superfluous in light of the 1870 Enforcement Act's section 4. Contemporary
courts accordingly understood that in the support-or-advocacy clauses
Congress had protected something broader than the right to vote. 97 This

rather than something broader. But this feature of the statute is more apparent than real. As
originally enacted, the second support-or-advocacy clause protected not "any citizen" but "any
such citizen," with the word "such" referring back to the reference to citizens in the first
support-or-advocacy clause. See ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13-14 (1871) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). So understood, "any such
citizen" in the second support-or-advocacy clause means "any citizen lawfully entitled to
vote." The word "such" disappeared from the statute in the transition from the original 1871
text to the Revised Statutes, perhaps inadvertently. Both the civil version of the second
support-or-advocacy clause at 24 Rev. Stat. § 1980 and the criminal version at 70 Rev. Stat.
§ 5520 read "any citizen," rather than "any such citizen." Given that the recodification did
not change the meaning of the statute, the present language must be read to carry the same
meaning as the original language. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983).
95. ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 140-146 (1870).
96. Id. § 4, 16 Stat. at 141. Section 3 of the 1870 Enforcement Act dealt withvoting rights
as well, using the word "vote" four different times. Id. § 3, 16 Stat. at 140-41.
97. For an example of a court's adjudicating a criminal indictment brought against private
parties under section 5520 (that is, the support-or-advocacy clauses), see United States v.
Goldman, 25 F. Cas. 1350, 1352 (C.C.D. La. 1878) (No. 15,225). In assessing the sufficiency

of the indictment, the court wrote as follows:
Now, as the support and advocacy which the alleged conspirators sought to prevent
were, as stated in the first and second counts, to be given in the future, it is clearly
not necessary to allege what shape that support and advocacy were to take. The
defendants could conspire to prevent the advocacy and support, in a lawful manner,
by the voters, of the election to congress of the person named, without knowing by
what means that advocacy and support were to be carried on, and even before the
means were agreed upon by the persons by whom the support and advocacy were to
be given.
Id. "Support and advocacy" in this passage must mean something different thanjust "voting,"
because the court says that "support and advocacy" can take different shapes and can be
carried on by different means. See id. If the statute reached only the specific form of support
and advocacy that is voting, the passage would make no sense. Consider also United States
v. Butler, 25 F. Cas. 213 (Waite, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. S.C. 1877) (No. 14,700).

The

defendants in that case were accused of intimidating and trying to stifle the political activity
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construction required no creativity: the statute says that it protects support
and advocacy, not just voting. And in more modern times, several courts
have similarly read the support-or-advocacy clauses as doing exactly what
they say-that is, as creating a cause of action not merely to vindicate the
right to vote but also to redress injuries caused by conspiracies to prevent
support or advocacy for political candidates. 98
C. Article I Versus the ReconstructionAmendments

That Congress intended the support-or-advocacy clauses to be substantive
rather than remedial legislation is a good reason to read them that way. But
it is also necessary to be sure of Congress's authority to enact the clauses as
substantive legislation.
Indeed, it is partly because courts have
misunderstood the constitutional basis of the support-or-advocacy clauses
that those courts have misread the clauses as remedial.
Because the support-or-advocacy clauses were originally enacted as part
of the Klan Act, it is easy to assume that Congress's authority to enact those
clauses comes from the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction
Amendments. Congress's power to enforce those amendments is generally
understood as a power to protect rights guaranteed by those amendments, not
a power to enact substantive legislation with a broader scope. 99 So if the
support-or-advocacy clauses are exercises of congressional power under the
Reconstruction Amendments, they might need to be understood as remedial,
even if Congress intended them to be substantive. But as we explain here,
the support-or-advocacy clauses are not legislation enacted under the
Reconstruction Amendments. As nineteenth-century courts recognized, the
clauses are exercises of Congress's powers to make rules for federal
elections.100 Those powers predate Reconstruction. As a textual matter, they

of an African American citizen who was a political supporter of Robert Smalls, an African
American member of Congress then running for reelection. The indictment recited separate
counts under section 5520 (that is, the support-or-advocacy clauses) and section 5508, which
prohibited conspiracies to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States." 70 Rev. Stat. § 5508. The counts under section 5508 specified that the
defendants were accused of acting against the victim's right to vote. Butler, 25 F. Cas. at 213.
The jury instructions specified that conviction under the two statutes required the prosecution
to prove different elements. Id. at 223-24. In so doing, it reflected the understanding that the
support-or-advocacy clauses cover something different than the right to vote. See also
Goldman, 25 F. Cas. at 1352 (discussing, in a case under the support-or-advocacy clauses, the
defendants' conduct as a conspiracy aimed at "support and advocacy" and "advocacy and
support" rather than voting).
98. See, e.g., LUIAC, No. 18-CV-00423, 2018 WL 3848404 (E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2018);
Ariz. Democratic Party v. Ariz. Republican Party, No. CV-16-03752-PHX, 2016 WL 8669978
(D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2016); see also Kush, 460 U.S. at 724 (describing the support-or-advocacy

clauses as protecting "the right to support candidates in federal elections," rather than "the
right to vote").
99. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
100. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-61 (1884); Goldman, 25 F. Cas at 1354

(holding that the support-or-advocacy clauses were "plainly warranted by section 4, art. I, of
the constitution").
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are rooted in Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4101 and in the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 102
To be sure, much of the Klan Act was enacted under Congress's power to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. Indeed, the statute was formally
titled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." 103 But not
everything in the Klan Act was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. The words "and for other purposes" appear in the formal
title, 104 and those words are not empty. As noted earlier, section 2 of the
Klan Act began by proscribing conspiracies to destroy the government, to
levy war on the United States, to oppose the government by force, to steal
federal property, and to prevent people from holding federal offices. 105
Congress would have the power to prohibit those conspiracies even if the
Reconstruction Amendments had never existed. Like section 2's clauses
prohibiting conspiracies to destroy the government, its clauses prohibiting
conspiracies to prevent citizens from giving support or advocacy in favor of
candidates for federal office are not-or at least, not only10 6-legislation
enacted under Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.
In its 1884 decision in Ex parte Yarbrough, the Supreme Court recognized
that the support-or-advocacy clauses are exercises of Congress's power to
make rules for the conduct of federal elections. 107 Ex parte Yarbrough
upheld the constitutionality of a criminal prosecution of eight white men
101. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 4, cl. 1 (stating that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators").
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress has the power "[t]o make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof').
We think that the proposition stated above-that the clauses are exercises of Congress's
powers under Article I rather than Congress's powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments-reflects the best reading of the materials. It is worth noting, however, that the
conclusions of the present analysis would be the same if the support-or-advocacy clauses were
exercises of both Congress's powers under Article I and Congress's powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments-that is, if each set of powers were independently sufficient to
authorize the legislation. For reasons explained in Parts II.A and II.B, above, the clauses
should be read as substantive if it is constitutionally permissible to read them that way. If
Congress's Article I powers suffice to authorize the clauses as substantive legislation, then the
clauses should be read as substantive (as Congress intended), whether or not some other set
of congressional powers would also authorize the clauses as remedial legislation.
103. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 18
U.S.C.).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 2, 17 Stat. at 13-14 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining that if both Article I and the
Reconstruction Amendments were independently sufficient to authorize the support-oradvocacy clauses, the clauses should be read as substantive because Congress intended them
as substantive and sufficient authority for enacting the clauses as substantive legislation exists
under Article I).
107. Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-61 (1884); see also United States v. Goldman,
25 F. Cas 1350, 1354 (C.C.D. La. 1878) (No. 15,225).
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accused of violently preventing a Black man named Berry Saunders from
voting in a congressional election. 108 The prosecution proceeded in part
under section 5520 of the Revised Statutes-that is, the support-or-advocacy
clauses. 109 Had section 5520 been enacted as legislation enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment, the prosecution would have had to fail. The
defendants in Ex parte Yarbrough were private parties, 1 10 and the Supreme
Court had held one year earlier that legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment could reach state actors only. 111 But as the Court explained,
section 5520 was warranted by constitutional authority predating the
Reconstruction Amendments-that is, by Congress's broad power "to
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and
corruption." 112
The Court's unanimous opinion in Ex parte Yarbrough supports two
different and independently sufficient accounts of the constitutional basis for
that power: one tied to the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 and one
tied to the Necessary and Proper Clause. The argument from the Elections
Clause is entirely straightforward: that clause authorizes Congress to make
rules for the manner of its own elections. 113 Surveying the history of
legislation structuring federal elections, the Ex parte Yarbrough Court
acknowledged that during the Constitution's first decades, Congress had not
much availed itself of its power under Section 4.114 But in the years since
1842, the Court continued, Congress had exercised its power under the
Elections Clause by creating several important pieces of substantive
legislation, including by requiring single-member district elections for the
House of Representatives and by fixing a uniform national Election Day. 115
It could not be doubted, the Court wrote, that the same power also authorized
the man who votes, from personal violence or
Congress to "protect . .
intimidation, and the election itself from corruption and fraud." 116
The account tied to the Necessary and Proper Clause requires a bit more
explication.
The Ex parte Yarbrough Court wrote that the national
government would have implicit authority to protect the integrity of its own
elections even if no clause of the Constitution expressly enumerated such a
power. 1 17 As the Court explained, Congress has the power to do what is
108. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
109. Id. at 655.
110. Id. at 655-56, 665-66 (naming the defendants and rejecting a defense based on the
defendants' status as private parties rather than state actors).
111. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
112. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
114. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 660 (observing that Congress "[has] been slow to

exercise the powers expressly conferred upon it in relation to elections by the fourth section
of the first article of the Constitution").
115. Id. at 660-61.
116. Id. at 661; see also Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) (noting that Article I,

Section 4 gives Congress the authority to legislate for the "protection of voters").
117. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658, 666. The proposition that the power of the

government to protect its own elections is inherent has been affirmed by the Supreme Court
on other occasions as well. See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (holding
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necessary for operating the government. That power is recognized by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which states that Congress has the power to
make laws necessary and proper "for carrying into execution . . all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or any Department or officer thereof." 118 And the government cannot
execute any of its powers if it cannot carry out the elections on which its
existence depends. Therefore, Congress is entitled under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to pass legislation securing the integrity of federal elections.
This rationale is one way of explaining Congress's authority to apply the
support-or-advocacy clauses not just to congressional elections, which are
the subject of the Elections Clause, but to presidential elections as well. 119
that Congress has inherent power to protect the integrity of presidential elections). Note that
this understanding does not make the Elections Clause surplusage. It merely means that the
function of the Elections Clause is to give the regulation of congressional elections to the states
in the absence of federal regulation. Without the Elections Clause, Congress and only
Congress could make rules for the conduct of congressional elections.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
119. A second way proceeds from the practical reality that registration and voting in
congressional elections occurs at the same times and places as registration and voting in
presidential elections. Given that reality, some legislation regulating presidential elections is
warranted as necessary and proper for executing the powers that Congress has over
congressional elections under the Elections Clause. Suppose, for example, that Congress
wants to ensure that voters in congressional elections can go to the polls without being
physically intimidated for voting or trying to vote. Under the Elections Clause, which
authorizes Congress to make rules for congressional elections, Congress could enact a criminal
statute reading: "No person shall intimidate another for the purpose of preventing that other
person from voting in a congressional election." But if Congress could not legislate for
presidential elections as well, then people who wanted to intimidate voters could exploit a
loophole. When prosecuted for violating the hypothetical statute described above, a defendant
could protest that he had no intent to prevent the victim of intimidation from voting in a
congressional election. He only intended to prevent the voter from voting in the presidential
election that was occurring at the same time and place. More generally, it might not be
possible to prevent wrongful behavior aimed at presidential elections from having deleterious
spillover effects on congressional elections. So, to ensure the effectiveness of rules protecting
congressional elections, Congress might need to make laws covering presidential elections as
well. On this understanding, the support-or-advocacy clauses of § 1985(3), in their application
to presidential elections, are exercises of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to execute one of Congress's "foregoing powers"-that is, its power under the
Elections Clause of Article I. This rationale matches a standard explanation for Congress's
authority to enact § 10307(a) and (b) of the VRA, which prohibit voter intimidation in state as
well as federal elections. See 52 U.S.C. § 10307(a)-(b). Again, the Elections Clause itself
reaches only congressional elections. But as a practical matter, state and federal elections
occur as single events, such that rules protecting voters from intimidation in congressional
elections could not be effective if would-be intimidators were free to intimidate people voting
in state elections. A law prohibiting voter intimidation in state elections can thus be warranted
as necessary and proper for carrying Congress's power to protect its own elections into
execution. See Cady & Glazer, supra note 18, at 212 ("If a voter is harassed at the polls voting
for their local officials, that voter is unlikely to feel safe at the same polling place on a different
day voting for their congressman. Similarly, those who are permitted to intimidate voters at
the polls in state and local elections may be emboldened to do the same in federal elections.").
The House of Representatives's own report on § 10307(b) made the same point. See
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1502-03 (Bernard Schwarz ed.,

1970). This rationale also makes sense of the fact that § 10307(c), which prohibits vote
buying, is-in contrast to the statute's voter intimidation provisions-applicable only to
federal elections. See 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)-(c). Voter intimidation has spillover effects: an
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Whether under the Elections Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or
both, Ex parte Yarbrough thus identified the support-or-advocacy clauses as
valid exercises of Congress's powers under Article I. And the fact that the
support-or-advocacy clauses are valid under Congress's Article I powers 120
bears directly on whether the clauses are substantive legislation or merely
vehicles for the assertion of preexisting rights. If no congressional power
other than the power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments authorized
Congress to enact the support-or-advocacy clauses, then those clauses would
need to be interpreted as legislation protecting only rights guaranteed by
those amendments. But Congress's power to regulate federal elections is not
merely a power to protect preexisting rights. Like its other Article I powers,
Congress's powerto regulate federal elections is apowerto make substantive
law. 12 1 Exercising its power under the Elections Clause, Congress has
established single-member districting for the House of Representatives, 122
set a uniform date for federal elections, 123 and regulated the financing of
political campaigns. 12 4 All of that legislation is substantive. So, Congress
in 1871 did have the power to enact the support-or-advocacy clauses as
substantive legislation on the basis of Article I. As a result, the constitutional
limits on congressional action furnish no reason to construe the support-oradvocacy clauses as remedial only.
In short, by all indications the support-or-advocacy clauses are substantive
legislation. The language is most naturally read as substantive. Most of the
statutory section in which the clauses were enacted is substantive. The
Supreme Court long ago treated the clauses as substantive, explaining that
they rest on Congress's substantive legislative power under Article I. What's
more, it is not easy to give any coherent account of how they could have been
act of violence against a single voter at a polling place can deter many voters from voting at
that location and perhaps even elsewhere. In contrast, the consequences of vote buying are
limited in scope by the number of voters who specifically choose to participate in the practice.
120. In some of their applications, the support-or-advocacy clauses can also be exercises
of Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. Suppose, for example, that
the members of a local sheriff's department conspired to use force to prevent Black citizens
from voting. That conspiracy would violate the support-or-advocacy clauses, and the acts
required to carry out the conspiracy would also violate the Fifteenth Amendment. But the fact
that the clauses can sometimes be justified by the Reconstruction Amendments as well as by
Article I in no way diminishes the sufficiency of Article I. What matters for present purposes
is that Article I, by itself, is a sufficient source of authority for the support-or-advocacy clauses
and that legislation under Article I need not be limited to the enforcement of rights specified
elsewhere.
121. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366 (holding that the Elections Clause authorizes Congress
"to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but
in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of
fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making
and publication of election returns"); United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903, 908-09 (4th
Cir. 1982) (holding that Congress may regulate any activity that potentially corrupts federal
elections).
122. See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c); see also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 660-61 (recognizing
this legislation as an exercise of power under the Elections Clause).
123. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; see also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 660-61 (recognizing
this legislation as an exercise of power under the Elections Clause).
124. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30126.
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intended to function as remedial-neither a First Amendment account nor a
right-to-vote account makes sense. The courts that have held otherwise have
simply made a mistake. The next two Parts explain how that mistake
happened.
III. UNPACKING EX PARTE YARBROUGH

Ex parte Yarbrough held that the support-or-advocacy clauses are valid
legislation under Congress's powers to protect federal elections. 12 5 But some
aspects of the Court's opinion require effort to parse. Ex parte Yarbrough
was a complex case. It concerned prosecutions under two different statutory
provisions, and its analysis touched on several different constitutional
clauses. Moreover, as is true of many nineteenth-century Supreme Court
opinions, the Ex parte Yarbrough opinion is not organized in the clean,
clause-by-clause and count-by-count way in which most modern lawyers are
taught to write. As a result, the reader of Ex parte Yarbrough sometimes has
to pay attention and understand the big picture in order to grasp what the
Court is doing with any given piece of its analysis. In that vein, in Cockrum,
one of the recent support-or-advocacy cases, the district court failed to
understand part of Ex parte Yarbrough's analysis, and its misunderstanding
led it astray on the question of whether the support-or-advocacy clauses are
substantive or remedial. 126 This Part accordingly does the work of reading
Ex parte Yarbrough slowly and carefully, thus giving future courts a clear
map of the opinion.
In the Cockrum decision the district court understood that Ex parte
Yarbrough associated the support-or-advocacy clauses with Article I, Section
4.127 But it could not quite get beyond the intuition that the clauses must rest
on the Reconstruction Amendments. The district court thus took Ex parte
Yarbrough to mean that the clauses are an exercise of a hybrid congressional
power, one that involves Article I, Section 4 but also requires the Fifteenth
Amendment. 128 On that reading, the valid application of section 5520 in Ex
parte Yarbrough depended on the fact that the conspiracy at issue aimed at
preventing Saunders, a Black man, from exercising his Fifteenth Amendment
right to vote. And, having concluded that Ex parte Yarbrough treated
Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment as a necessary part of
Congress's authority to enact the support-or-advocacy clauses, the Cockrum
court concluded that the clauses are merely remedial. 129

125. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
126. See Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 663-64
(E.D. Va. 2019).
127. Id. at 663.
128. Id. at 663-64 (describing Ex parte Yarbrough as upholding the support-or-advocacy

clauses as exercises of "Congress's Article I, Section 4 powers and the Fifteenth
Amendment's substantive right to vote").
129. See id. at 664 ("This effectively undercuts Plaintiffs' position that the support or
advocacy clauses create a stand-alone substantive right of action .... ").
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It is certainly true, as the Cockrum court noted, that the Supreme Court in
Ex parte Yarbrough discussed the Fifteenth Amendment. 130 But Ex parte
Yarbrough did not hold that Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment was a necessary basis for the enactment of the support-oradvocacy clauses, nor that the section 5520 prosecution before it was
predicated on the violation of a Fifteenth Amendment right. Indeed, as we
explain in Part IILA, Ex parte Yarbrough could not possibly have so held
given the Court's understanding of the Fifteenth Amendment. Therefore, it
should not be surprising that a careful reading of the Court's opinion reveals
that Ex parte Yarbrough's discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment was not
part of its analysis of the support-or-advocacy prosecution at all. As we
explain in Part III.B, that discussion was part of the Court's analysis of a
different question presented in the case about the constitutionality of a
different section of the federal criminal code.
A. Race and Reese
The Fifteenth Amendment does not create a general right to vote. It creates
a more specific right against discrimination in voting "on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." 13 1 According to prevailing
doctrine at the time of Ex parte Yarbrough, it followed that a federal statute
could only be justified as Fifteenth Amendment legislation if it was worded
as a prohibition on those specific kinds of discrimination. 132 The support-oradvocacy clauses make no reference to race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. The Ex parte Yarbrough Court therefore could not have been
saying-and did not say-that those clauses were valid legislation under
Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court case establishing this point was United States v.
Reese, 133 which was decided in 1876 and expressly discussed in Ex parte
Yarbrough.134 Reese concerned the prosecution of Kentucky election
inspectors who refused to receive the votes of Black voters on the same terms
as white voters. 135 The inspectors were prosecuted under the 1870
Enforcement Act, 136 which, as discussed above, prohibited conspiracies to
prevent people from voting. 137 The question in the case was whether
Congress could constitutionally enact that legislation. 138 Because the
election in question was for local officials, 139 the statute as applied could not
130. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664 (1884).
131. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.

132. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1876). For reasons explained below,
it is possible that this proposition applied only to criminal statutes. But that wrinkle makes no
difference here, because the support-or-advocacy clauses as adjudicated in Ex parte
Yarbrough were criminal provisions.
133. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
134. See 110 U.S. at 665.
135. Reese, 92 U.S. at 224.
136. Id. at 220.
137. See supra Part H.A.
138. Reese, 92 U.S. at 218.
139. Id. at 223-24.
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be justified as an exercise of Congress's power under the Elections Clause of
Article I, which gives Congress the power to make rules for the election of
members of Congress.140 Instead, the case was argued solely on the question
of whether the relevant statutory provisions were valid exercises of
Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 14 1
The answer to that question was no. The Fifteenth Amendment, the Court
explained, conferred a right against discrimination in voting, not a right to
vote as such. 142 Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment was
therefore not a power to protect the right to vote in general but only a power
to protect the right not to be discriminated against in the voting context on
the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 143 The language
of the 1870 Enforcement Act, the Court noted, was not limited to such cases
of discrimination. 144 It purported to reach any conspiracies to deny the right
to vote. 145 In so doing, the 1870 Enforcement Act went beyond Congress's
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. And the Court specifically
refused to narrow the statute by judicial construction or to hold the statute
valid as applied, because the particular facts before it did involve racial
discrimination. 146 To sustain the prosecution in that way, the Court
explained, would permit Congress to cast a wide net, putatively criminalizing
behavior regardless of whether it actually had the authority to do so and to
leave it to the courts to say who could actually be punished. 147 That, the
Court wrote, would be inappropriate.148 The Court concluded that the
necessary solution to the problem of statutory overbreadth was to hold the
provisions flatly unconstitutional. 149
The holding of Reese, then, was that a criminal statute not worded in terms
of discrimination on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude could not be justified as an enforcement of Fifteenth Amendment
rights, even as applied to cases of racial discrimination. 150 It follows that the
support-or-advocacy clauses could not have been upheld in Ex parte
Yarbrough as legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. Like the
voting rights provisions of the 1870 Enforcement Act, the support-oradvocacy clauses of the Klan Act make no reference to race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. If the support-or-advocacy clauses rested on
the power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, they would have been
overbroad in exactly the way that the statute in Reese was overbroad. Like
Reese, Ex parte Yarbrough reviewed a criminal conviction, so the
overbreadth would have been exactly as intolerable in Reese as it was in Ex
140. Id. at 218.
141. Id. at 215, 218.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id.

150. Id. at 220-21.
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parte Yarbrough.151 The Ex parte Yarbrough Court was fully aware of Reese

and discussed it explicitly, 152 and there is no indication that Ex parte
Yarbrough took issue with the analysis in Reese on this point. It is
accordingly not possible to construe Ex parte Yarbrough as treating the
support-or-advocacy clauses as legislation enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment. 153 Nor is there any need to, because Article I is a fully
sufficient source of authority for the purpose.
B. A Tale of Two Statutes

The Ex parte Yarbrough Court did discuss the Fifteenth Amendment but
it did so in connection with a separate issue. 154 As noted above, Ex parte
Yarbrough upheld the constitutionality of two statutory provisions under
which defendants had been prosecuted. One was section 5520 of the Revised
Statutes-that is, the support-or-advocacy clauses. 155 The other was section
5508-originally section 6 of the 1870 Enforcement Act-which prohibited
conspiracies to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free
exercise . . of any right or privilege secured . . by the Constitution or laws
of the United States." 156 As that language indicates, section 5508 was a
remedial provision rather than a substantive one. A valid prosecution under
section 5508 required a showing that the victim had been injured for
exercising some "right or privilege so secured . . . by the Constitution or laws
of the United States." 157 So, to uphold the prosecution under section 5508,
the Ex parte Yarbrough Court needed to conclude that the defendants had

151. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 652 (1884).
152. Id. at 665.

153. Other indications point in the same direction. For example, one year before Ex parte
Yarbrough, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Fifteenth Amendment

authorized Congress to pass section 5519 of the Revised Statutes. United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 637 (1883). In so doing, the Court identified two other statutory sections-sections
5506 and 5507-as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. The Court made no suggestion
that section 5520 enforced the Fifteenth Amendment. Given that section 5520 was nearer in
the statute book to the section at issue than sections 5506 and 5507 and given also that section
5520 (unlike sections 5506 and 5507) was originally part of the same statute and statutory
section as section 5519, it would have been odd for the Court to pass over section 5520 in this
discussion if section 5520 was in fact legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.
154. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 655.

155.
156.

Id.
See 70 Rev. Stat. § 5508; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 654-55. This scenario,

where the same events gave rise to prosecutions under both sections 5520 and 5508, was not
unique in Ex parte Yarbrough. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 25 F. Cas. 213 (Waite, Circuit

Justice, C.C.D. S.C. 1877) (No. 14,700) (featuring a prosecution under both statutes). The
lower court's treatment of the prosecutions in Butler reinforces the point that the two statutes
criminalized different things and that in a case in which defendants were prosecuted under
both statutes, the prosecution under section 5508 required a showing about a right established
under some other source of federal law-thus necessitating a showing of discriminatory
purpose on the section 5508 counts-while the prosecution under section 5520 merely
required a showing of a conspiracy to engage in the conduct described in section 5520 itself.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing Butler).
157. See 70 Rev. Stat. § 5508.
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conspired to prevent the victim from exercising some preexisting federal
right.
The relevant right in this case, the Court wrote, was the right to vote. 158
But Ex parte Yarbrough did not locate this right to vote in the Fifteenth
Amendment. Instead, Ex parte Yarbrough held that the section 5508
prosecution was valid because the defendants had violated the victim's right
to vote under Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that all
persons who are eligible under state law to vote in elections for the most
numerous house of the state legislature are also eligible to vote for members
of the House of Representatives. 159 Under Georgia law at the time, Saunders
formally had the right to vote in state legislative elections. 160 So, under
158. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 662.
159. Id. at 663; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (specifying that in elections for the
House of Representatives, "the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislatures"). The mention of a
constitutional right to vote that is not race-specific might (but should not) raise questions about
whether this Article's prior discussion of the relationship between the support-or-advocacy
clauses and the right to vote has been adequate. Above, we explained why the Court in Ex
parte Yarbrough could not have regarded the support-or-advocacy clauses as legislation
enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment: the support-or-advocacy clauses are race-neutral, and
Reese held that a facially race-neutral statute could not create criminal liability for violations
of the Fifteenth Amendment. See supra Part IILA. One might wonder, though, whether Ex

parte Yarbroughcould have considered the support-or-advocacy clauses legislation enforcing
not the Fifteenth Amendment's right against discrimination in voting but Article I, Section 2's
right to vote in congressional elections. That right to vote is race-neutral, and it runs against
private parties as well as state actors. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
The support-or-advocacy clauses are similar in those two respects. So even if the support-oradvocacy clauses should not be understood as legislation protecting the Fifteenth Amendment
right to vote, one might wonder whether they are legislation protecting the Article I, Section
2 right to vote-and, if so, whether they might be remedial rather than substantive after all.
For several reasons, however, nothing about Article I, Section 2 affects the support-oradvocacy clauses' status as substantive legislation. For one, nothing about Ex parte
Yarbrough's discussion of Article I, Section 2 was relevant to the support-or-advocacy
clauses. Article I, Section 2 was relevant only to the portion of Ex parte Yarbrough that arose
under section 5508. More broadly, even if the support-or-advocacy clauses were designed to
protect the right to vote guaranteed by Article I, Section 2, it would not follow that the clauses
were remedial only. If Congress legislates to protect the right guaranteed by Article I, Section
2, it does so with its power to regulate congressional elections under Article I, Section 4.
Article I, Section 4 names a power to enact substantive legislation, not-like the enforcement
clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments-a power to enact remedial legislation only. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. To be sure, Congress acting under Article I, Section 4 could enact a
statute that was remedial only. It could, for example, enact a statute with the following text:
"Any person who suffers a violation of the right to vote as guaranteed by Article I, Section 2
shall have a cause of action for damages." But that is not what the support-or-advocacy
clauses say. As explained in Part II.A above, Congress enacted a statutory provision expressly
and specifically protecting the right to vote in 1870, one year before it enacted the support-oradvocacy clauses. To think that the support-or-advocacy clauses are no more than legislation
vindicating the substantive right to vote conferred by Article I, Section 2 is thus to make those
clauses superfluous in light of a statute passed the previous year, as well as to give them a
much narrower scope than their language indicates.
160. See tit. 14, 1 GA. CODE § 1276 (1882) (providing that all male citizens of the United
States, regardless of race, aged twenty-one or older, who satisfied residency and taxpaying
requirements, and did not come within exceptions here relevant, were qualified to vote for the
Georgia General Assembly). Prior to 1868, Georgia's constitution limited the franchise to
white male citizens. See GA. CONST. of 1865, art. V. In 1868, Georgia adopted a new
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Article I, Section 2, he had a federal right to vote in congressional elections
as well.
In contrast, it is not at all clear that the Ex parte Yarbrough Court could
have identified the Fifteenth Amendment as the source ofthe right underlying
the section 5508 prosecution-let alone the section 5520 prosecutionbecause it is not at all clear that any violation of Fifteenth Amendment rights
had occurred. True, the victim in the case was Black, and he was attacked,
inter alia, to prevent him from voting. 161 But the Fifteenth Amendment is
addressed to government officials, 162 and the defendants in Ex parte
Yarbrough were private actors. 163 In contrast, the Article I, Section 2 right
to vote in congressional elections has no state action component. The
constitutional clause contains no state action language, and the Supreme
Court has clearly identified the Article I, Section 2 right to vote as one that
the Constitution protects against interference by private parties. 164 So even
if the defendants had violated no Fifteenth Amendment right, the prosecution
under section 5508 could proceed on the ground that the defendants had
conspired to prevent Saunders from exercising a right to vote that he held
under Article I, Section 2.165

constitution that removed the racial qualification. See GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 2. Section
1276 of the 1882 Georgia Code was written to conform to the relevant provisions of a yet later
constitution, adopted in 1877, which also had no racial limitation. See GA. CONST. of 1877,
art. I, §§ 1-2.
161. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 655-56.
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.") (emphasis added); see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S.
127, 139 (1903) ("[A] statute which purports to punish purely individual action cannot be
sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred by the 15th Amendment upon
Congress .... ").
163. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Classic, 313 U.S. at 315 ("And since the constitutional command [of Article

I, Section 2] is without restriction or limitation, the right, unlike those guaranteed by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is secured against the action of individuals as well as
of states." (citing Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 663-64)).

165. We do not claim that this state action point is completely dispositive. As Ellen Katz
has explained, there is room to argue that the post-Reconstruction Court left open the
possibility that Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment might authorize
legislation against private parties who interfered with voting rights. See Ellen D. Katz,
Reinforcing Representation: CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2341, 2357-59 (2003).

On that view, § 10307(b) of the VRA might be understood as Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation that reaches private parties. See 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b) (barring any
person, "whether acting under color of law or otherwise," from intimidating actual or
prospective voters); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1549 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)

(Hatchett, J., dissenting) (stating that the constitutionality of § 10307(b) is "questionable" for
this reason). We take no position on this question here. We do mean to point out, of course,
that if Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation is valid only against state actors, the
prosecution in Ex parte Yarbrough could not have been predicated on a violation of Fifteenth
Amendment rights. But for present purposes, this point is not necessary. Even without
reference to the state action problem, Reese indicates that the support-or-advocacy clauses
could not have been Fifteenth Amendment legislation because they make no mention of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude. See supraPart IILA.
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The Court then defended the proposition that Article I, Section 2 confers a
predicate right to vote against the objection that the Constitution actually
creates no right to vote at all. 166 That objection had some basis in the Court's
prior discussions of suffrage. In Minor v. Happersett,167 which rejected the
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment entitled women to vote on the same
terms as men, the Court had written that "the Constitution of the United
States does not confer the right of suffrage on any one." 168 According to that
way of thinking, the right to vote is allocated by state law, and the
Constitution simply prohibits certain kinds of discrimination in the
allocation.
The relevance of this idea in Ex parte Yarbrough was
straightforward: if the Constitution did not confer a right of suffrage on
anyone, it could not confer one on Saunders, so the Ex parte Yarbrough
defendants could not be prosecuted for conspiring to prevent Saunders from
exercising his constitutional right to vote. To meet that objection, the Ex
parte Yarbrough Court explained that the proposition that the Constitution
does not confer the right to vote means that the Constitution is not
independently sufficient to establish anyone's right to vote. 169 Given certain
background conditions of state law, however, the Constitution does create a
right to vote. Under Article 1, Section 2, a person who has the right to vote
in state legislative elections under state law has a federal constitutional right
to vote in elections for Congress.1 70 A conspiracy to prevent the exercise of
that right would be criminal under section 5508.
Only after all of that was established did the Ex parte Yarbrough Court
begin to discuss the Fifteenth Amendment. To buttress its argument that
Congress could protect the right to vote, the Court pointed to the Fifteenth
Amendment as "clearly show[ing] that the right of suffrage was considered
to be of supreme importance to the national government, and was not
intended to be left within the exclusive control of the States." 17 1 Then, just
as the Court's argument about Article I, Section 2 had to contend with
language from Minor saying that the Constitution confers no right to vote,
this invocation of the Fifteenth Amendment required the Court to parry
similar language from Reese, according to which the "Fifteenth Amendment
does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one." 172 That proposition, the
Ex parte Yarbrough Court acknowledged, was "quite true." 173 But just as
Article I, Section 2 conferred a constitutional right to vote on every person
qualified to vote in state legislative elections, the Fifteenth Amendment
166.
167.
168.
169.

Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 662-63.
88 U.S. 162 (1875).
Id. at 178.
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 664 ("[T]he right is not definitely conferred on any

person or class of persons by the Constitution alone, because you have to look to the law of
the state for the description of the class.") (emphasis added).
170. Id. (stating that once a person qualifies under state law as a voter in state legislative
elections, "his right to vote for a member of congress [is] ... fundamentally based upon the
Constitution").
171. Id.
172. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875).
173. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 665.
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conferred a constitutional right to vote on any Black person ("whether they
be men or women," the Court said) who would have the right to vote but for
laws purporting to restrict voting to white people. 1 74
That discussion was dictum. Once the Court identified Article I, Section
2 as the source of the right on which the section 5508 prosecution validly
rested, no further constitutional authority needed to be adduced. Moreover,
the discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment could not supply the legal
authority for the Court's holding unless the Court was willing to say that
congressional enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment could reach beyond
state actors. As noted above, the defendants in Ex parte Yarbrough were
private parties.175 And even if the Fifteenth Amendment had been material
to the Court's holding with respect to the prosecution under section 5508, it
would have had no bearing on the prosecution under section 5520-that is,
the support-or-advocacy clauses. With respect to the support-or-advocacy
clauses, Ex parte Yarbrough did not discuss the Fifteenth Amendment at all.
Indeed, the Court expressly denied that any showing about the right to vote
was relevant to the support-or-advocacy prosecution, as opposed to the
prosecution under section 5508.176 Even if the "proposition . . . that the right
to vote . .
is not dependent upon the constitution or laws of the United
States . . . . were conceded," the Court wrote-that is, even if there were no
showing of a relevant preexisting federal right, "the importance to the general
government of having the general election .. . free from force and fraud is
not diminished." 177 In other words, even if the absence of a preexisting right
defeated the constitutional application of section 5508 in the case at hand, the
application of section 5520 would remain valid because section 5520 was
rooted in the congressional power to protect federal elections, rather than the
congressional power to enforce preexisting rights.
Ex parte Yarbrough thus recognized what all other indications about the
statute also suggest: the question of preexisting rights is not material to a
claim under the support-or-advocacy clauses. Those clauses, like most of
section 2 of the Klan Act, are substantive legislation. Nothing about the
case's discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment suggests otherwise.
IV. SUPPORT-OR-ADVOCACY VERSUS EQUAL PROTECTION

The misreading of Ex parte Yarbrough is one of two routes through which
courts have mistakenly taken the support-or-advocacy clauses to be remedial
rather than substantive. The other route runs through a conflation of the
support-or-advocacy clauses with the two clauses that precede them in
@ 1985(3)-the ones that cover conspiracies to deny the equal protection of
the laws.

174. Id.
175. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
176. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 662-63.
177. Id.
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Most courts have less experience with @ 1985(3)'s support-or-advocacy
clauses than with its equal protection clauses. 178 And it is well established
that those equal protection clauses are remedial. 179 They provide causes of
action to vindicate federal rights created elsewhere, notably, if not
exclusively, by the Reconstruction Amendments. 180 Courts familiar with the
equal protection clauses have found it intuitive that the less familiar supportor-advocacy clauses should be treated the same way. 181 After all, the equal
protection clauses and the support-or-advocacy clauses today make up a
single statutory codification-the one we call @ 1985(3). Other things being
equal, it is reasonable to think that if the first two clauses of a statutory
subsection are remedial, so are the next two clauses.
But that way of thinking does not make sense as applied to @ 1985(3). The
premise of this interpretive move is that the grouping of the equal protection
clauses and the support-or-advocacy clauses together in a single statutory
subsection-@ 1985(3)-is interpretively significant.
But as explained
above, no interpretive significance can be given to the grouping of four
clauses in something called @ 1985(3) because @ 1985(3) is not a meaningful
unit of legislation. 182 It is an artifact of a recodification that the Supreme
Court has made clear has no interpretive significance. 183 If one wanted to
make inferences about whether the support-or-advocacy clauses were
substantive or remedial by looking to the nature of the other clauses with
which the support-or-advocacy clauses are meaningfully grouped, one would
have to ask not about the clauses that appear in @ 1985(3) but about the
clauses that appeared in section 2 of the Klan Act-almost all of which were
substantive. 184

The courts that have construed the support-or-advocacy clauses in pari
materia with the equal protection clauses on this point have done so under
the influence of misreadings of two Supreme Court cases: GreatAmerican
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 185 decided in 1979, and United
Brotherhoodof Carpenters& Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 18 6 decided in 1983.

In Novotny, a case arising under @ 1985(3)'s first equal protection clause, the
Court wrote that "[s]ection 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself, it
merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates."187 In
Carpenters,which also arose under @ 1985(3)'s first equal protection clause,
the Court wrote that "[t]he rights, privileges, and immunities that @ 1985(3)
178. As noted earlier, there may be no more than three federal appellate opinions deciding
questions arising under the support-or-advocacy clauses from any time in the last one hundred
years. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
179. See infra Part IV.C.
180. See infra Part IV.C.
181. See, e.g., Gill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 906 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1990);
Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Va. 2019).
182. See supra Part IIA.
183. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983).
184. See supra Part IIA.
185. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
186. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
187. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372.
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vindicates must be found elsewhere." 18 8 Some courts have taken this
language to mean that no clause of @ 1985(3) provides any substantive
rights. 189
If the words quoted from Novotny and Carpenterswere read in isolation,
that interpretation would be understandable. The quoted language speaks of
"@ 1985(3),"190 not of the equal protection clauses in particular, and the
support-or-advocacy clauses are part of @ 1985(3). But if one remembers
that @ 1985(3) is an administrative recodification whose grouping of clauses
has no substantive significance, rather than a deliberate grouping of clauses
by Congress, 191 one might be cautious about language that seems to treat the
four clauses of @ 1985(3) as an undifferentiated whole. And in context, it is
clear that the Supreme Court's statements about @ 1985(3)'s not providing
substantive rights referred only to the first clause, or perhaps the first two
clauses, of @ 1985(3). They have no bearing on the support-or-advocacy
clauses.
To explain the proper reading of the language from Novotny and
Carpenters, we provide below relevant background about the career of
@ 1985(3)'s equal protection clauses before those two decisions. We then
explicate Novotny and Carpentersthemselves.
A. 1871-1971: Harris, Collins, and Griffin
As noted earlier, the equal protection clauses of @ 1985(3) were originally
enacted as two clauses of section 2 of the Klan Act. 192 In the Revised
Statutes, they appeared in two locations: as civil liability provisions in
section 1980 of the Revised Statutes and as criminal provisions in section
5519 of the Revised Statutes. 193 In United States v. Harris,194 decided in
1883, the Supreme Court held section 5519 unconstitutional on the ground
that Congress had no authority to prohibit denials of equal protection beyond
those perpetrated by state actors. 195 As in Reese, the Court in Harrisruled
that a criminal law with unconstitutional applications had to fall in its
entirety. 196 So section 5519-the criminal liability incarnation of the equal
protection clauses-became a dead letter. The separately codified civil
incarnation remained formally valid but, like a great deal of Reconstruction
legislation, it fell into disuse. Not until 1951, in Collins v. Hardyman,197 did

188. Carpenters,463 U.S. at 833.
189. See Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 2004) (first citing Carpenters,
463 U.S. at 833; and then citing Novotny, 442 U.S. at 376); Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 661 (E.D. Va. 2019) (first citing Carpenters,463 U.S. at
833; and then citing Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372).
190. See Carpenters,463 U.S. at 833; Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372.
191. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983).
192. See supra Part I.A.
193. See supra Part I.B.

194. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
195. Id. at 641-42.
196. Id. at 642-43.

197. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).

2020]

THE SUPPORT-OR-ADVOCACY CLAUSES

179

the Supreme Court adjudicate a civil claim under the statute's equal
protection clauses. 198
The plaintiffs in Collins were California communists who alleged a
conspiracy to use violence and the threat of violence to disrupt one of their
political meetings. 199 According to the complaint, the defendants' conduct
was actionable under the statute 200 as a conspiracy to deprive them "of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." 20 1 The Supreme Court rejected
the claim. 20 2 The defendants were private actors, and the Court concluded
that their conspiracy did not aim to deny the equal protection of the laws. 203
That said, the Collins Court did not categorically hold that only state actors
could be proper defendants in claims under the relevant statutory provision.
Noting that the original target of the statute was the Ku Klux Klan, the Court
allowed that a conspiracy massive and powerful enough to deny people the
possibility of legal or political protection could come within the statute, even
if the conspirators were not formally state actors. 204 But to construe the
statute as reaching garden-variety private conspiracies, the Court said, would
raise serious constitutional problems, including problems about the basis of
congressional authority to enact the statute. 20 5 After all, any conspiracy to
injure particular people unlawfully might be described as a conspiracy to
deny the equal protection of the laws. So, a federal cause of action that broad
might be tantamount to a federal cause of action for tortious conspiracy in
general.
Collins was decided in 1951. Twenty years later, after a significant
invigoration of the judicial commitment to racial equality 206 and a
recognition of robust congressional authority to legislate for that purpose, 207
the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge2 0 8 held that private conspiracies to deny
equal protection, even on a small scale, are indeed actionable under the first
clause of @ 1985(3).209 The plaintiffs in Griffin, who were Black, alleged
that the defendants, who were white, blocked their car and then physically

198. Id. at 656 (explaining that the provisions had "long been dormant"). This is not to say
that the Court had never previously come into contact with what are now the equal protection
provisions of § 1985(3) at all. Claims under those provisions were asserted in two prior
Supreme Court cases. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). But in neither case did the Court engage in any substantive
construction of the statute. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,
371 n.8 (1979) (tracing this history).
199. Collins, 341 U.S. at 653.

200. At the time of Collins, the relevant statutory provision was codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 47(3), not 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
201. Collins, 341 U.S. at 654.
202. Id. at 663.
203. Id. at 661, 665.
204. Id. at 662.
205. Id. at 659.
206. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
207. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred A. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Heart of Atlanta Hotel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

208. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
209. Id. at 96-97.
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assaulted them, motivated by the belief that the owner of the car was a civil
rights organizer. 2 10 The plaintiffs sued under the first clause of @ 1985(3),
alleging a conspiracy to deny them equal protection. 211 Taking its cue from
Collins, the district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
conspirators were not state actors. 2 12
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the spirit of Collins without
formally overruling it.213 The statutory language, the Griffin Court noted,
was clearly written to reach private conspiracies and not just conspiracies by
state actors. 2 14 That was why the Court in Harris struck down the criminal
incarnation of the provision, after all. 2 15 And in light of constitutional
developments since Collins, the Griffin Court was less worried about
congressional power to reach private conspiracies. 2 16
Still, Griffin took seriously the concern that the wording of @ 1985(3)'s
first clause, read for all it could be worth, might make a tremendous amount
of conduct actionable in the federal courts. 2 17 To address this problem,
Griffin imposed a limiting construction. The legislative history and the
language of "equal protection," the Court wrote, implied "that there must be
some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators' action." 2 18 A racially motivated conspiracy
against Black victims, like the one in the case at hand, would qualify, but a
conspiracy to perpetrate a similarly violent assault that arose out of, say, a
financially motivated intention to rob the victims or out of a purely personal
hatred would not.
This requirement of class-based animus has been a core part of @ 1985(3)
doctrine ever since Griffin.2 19 And it fully establishes that what is true of that
subsection's equal protection clauses need not be true of its support-oradvocacy clauses. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the requirement of
class-based animus applies only in cases alleging conspiracies under those
clauses of @ 1985 that are worded in terms of equal protection. 220 It does not
apply in cases arising under the support-or-advocacy clauses. 22 1 The reasons
for the difference are not obscure. Formally, the Supreme Court in Griffin
grounded the requirement of class-based animus in the statutory language
210. Id. at 89-91.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 89-92.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 96-97, 100-02.
Id. at 97 (discussing United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 629 (1883)).
See id. at 95-96 ("Whether or not Collins v. Hardyman was correctly decided on its

own facts is a question with which we need not here be concerned. But it is clear, in the light
of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was decided,
that many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist. Little reason
remains, therefore, not to accord to the words of the statute their apparent meaning.").
217. Id. at 101-02.
218. Id. at 102.
219. See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S.
825, 829, 837 (1983); Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726 (1983).
220. Kush, 460 U.S. at 726.
221. Id.
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about equal protection-language that distinguishes the first two clauses of
@ 1985(3) from the last two. 222 As a matter of policy, requiring class-based
animus prevents the broadly worded equal protection clauses from creating
something like a general federal law of tort conspiracy. 223 But the rationale
for such a narrowing construction is inapplicable to the support-or-advocacy
clauses because their language does not threaten to create a federal cause of
action for tortious conspiracies in general. It reaches only a specified kind of
conduct, one straightforwardly suitable for federal protection because of its
direct connection to federal elections. The Supreme Court has accordingly
recognized that plaintiffs suing under the support-or-advocacy clauses, like
plaintiffs suing under the portions of @ 1985(1) and (2) covering conspiracies
against federal officers and federal witnesses, need not show class-based
animus. 224 In short, the class-based animus requirement reinforces the point
that @ 1985(3) is not a single unit. Its separate clauses need to be interpreted
on their own terms.
B. Equal Protection Language as Remedial Legislation

Like the requirement of class-based animus, the status of @ 1985(3)'s equal
protection clause as remedial rather than substantive legislation is a function
of those clauses' particularlanguage. There are two ways to understand why.
First, a statutory provision providing a cause of action in cases of
conspiracies to deny "the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws" expressly refers to other laws that provide
protection, privileges, and immunities. 22 5 The language makes the provision
parasitic on the substance of other laws. Whether a conspiracy aims to deny
someone the equal protection of the laws depends, within this framework, on
what protections the substantive law offers.
Second, a federal law creating a substantive right of equal treatment in
general might be beyond Congress's power to enact, even after the Second
Reconstruction. Neither Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment nor any
other constitutional provision has been understood to give Congress the
authority to legislate a requirement that all people, as a general matter, must
be treated equally by private and public actors alike. 226 But Congress does
have the power to create a cause of action to vindicate people's equal right
to enjoy whatever rights Congress has the authority to protect. If a right is

222. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 ("The language requiring intent to deprive of equal

protection . .. means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
individually discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."); see also Kush, 460 U.S.
at 725 (explaining that the requirement of class-based animus does not apply to those portions
of § 1985 that "contain no language requiring that the conspirators act with intent to deprive
their victims of the equal protection of the laws").
223. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02 (explaining that the requirement of class-based animus
functions to prevent § 1985(3) from functioning "as a general federal tort law").
224. Kush, 460 U.S. at 726.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (reaffirming that federal

legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment is limited by the state action requirement).
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validly established by some substantive federal law, Congress can create
causes of action to remedy violations of that right. 227 So the broad equal
protection language of @ 1985(3)'s first two clauses gives rise to the
understanding that those clauses are remedial rather than substantive-and
sensibly so.
Consider some examples: a conspiracy by state actors to engage in racial
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause would be validly actionable under @ 1985(3). So would a conspiracy
by state actors to deny rights protected under the Due Process Clause or a
conspiracy by state actors to deny the freedom of speech described in the
First Amendment as incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment. In
each of those contexts, Congress's creation of a cause of action to vindicate
the relevant right would be a straightforward exercise of its enforcement
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress has
similar authority to enforce the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, so
Congress can also validly create causes of action against people who conspire
to deprive people of their Thirteenth or Fifteenth Amendments rights. To put
the point generally, @ 1985(3)'s equal protection clauses can be validly
applied to protect any right that Congress has the constitutional authority to
protect. But those clauses cannot be the source of a general substantive right
to equal treatment, because Congress has no authority to create such a right.
Hence the formulation that the equal protection clauses of @ 1985(3) are
vehicles for the assertion of rights specified elsewhere and not independently
substantive.
Plaintiffs bringing suit under the equal protection clauses of @ 1985(3)
must accordingly identify the underlying federal rights that they seek to
vindicate. In Griffin, the Court identified two such rights at issue in the case
before it. The first was the right to be free of badges and incidents of slavery,
as guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment. 228 The other was the right to
interstate travel, which was implicated because the defendants allegedly
conspired to impede the movement of their victims, one of whom was from
a different state, on a public highway near an interstate border.229 Both of
these rights, the Court noted, run against private parties as well as state
actors. 2 30 So when the plaintiffs in Griffin brought suit under @ 1985(3), the
statute gave them a cause of action for vindicating those underlying rights,
both of which Congress has the authority to enforce.

227. Mitchumv. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) (explaining that "[s]ection 1983 opened

the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions
under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of
the Nation"); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U.

ILL. L. REV. 183, 186 (explaining that Congress can "provid[e] a cause of action for individuals
who have been injured by the conduct Congress wishes to proscribe").
228. Grifin, 403 U.S. at 105.
229. Id. at 105-06.
230. Id.
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C. Novotny and Carpenters
The misconception that plaintiffs suing under the support-or-advocacy
clauses must identify substantive federal rights specified elsewhere arises
partly from misreadings of two Supreme Court cases-Novotny and
Carpenters-decidedin the wake of Griffin. In these decisions, the Court
reaffirmed that the equal protection clauses of @ 1985(3) are vehicles for the
assertion of rights created elsewhere. But the analysis of these cases
concerned the equal protection clauses only. It carries no implications for
the support-or-advocacy clauses.
The plaintiff in Novotny argued that he had been fired from his job in
consequence of a conspiracy to deny the equal enjoyment of workplace rights
guaranteed by Title VII.231 Because Title VII is federal legislation, the rights
it guarantees are rights that Congress has the authority to protect. Congress
validly created those rights, and Congress can create remedies to vindicate
them. The Novotny Court held, however, that Title VII could not supply the
predicate rights for the plaintiff's putative action under @ 1985(3).232 As the
Court explained, Congress had enacted a detailed administrative scheme for
the specific purpose of enforcing Title VII.233 So, Congress can protect Title
VII rights, but Congress has opted to provide that protection by means other
than @ 1985(3). Accordingly, the plaintiff in Novotny could not predicate his
@ 1985(3) claim on a Title VII violation. 2 34 And without some predicate right
to assert, his @ 1985(3) claim would not lie. As the Court wrote, "[s]ection
1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself, it merely provides a remedy"
for the violation of rights created elsewhere. 235
Carpenters is to the same effect. The plaintiffs in that case were
employees at a nonunion workplace who alleged that they had been
physically assaulted by a labor union mob. 2 36 They brought suit under the
equal protection clauses of @ 1985(3).237 Quoting Novotny, the Supreme
Court in Carpentersnoted that "@ 1985(3) . .. 'provides no substantial rights
itself to the class conspired against. The rights, privileges, and immunities
that @ 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere." 2 38 To have a successful
claim, therefore, the plaintiffs would have to have been able to characterize
the assault they suffered as the denial of the equal enjoyment of a substantive
right created by a different source of law, one that Congress had the authority
to vindicate with a cause of action. The Supreme Court accordingly
construed the plaintiffs' claim as contending that the defendant mob had
conspired to deny the plaintiffs their First Amendment rights of association-

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1979).
Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 376.
See id. at 378.
Id. at 372.

236. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 827
(1983).
237. Id. at 827.
238. Id. at 833 (citations omitted) (quoting Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372).
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a characterization that, if successful, would have let the plaintiffs proceed. 239
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court concluded that the complaint
alleged no actual violation of First Amendment rights because the defendants
were private parties and the First Amendment runs only against state
actors. 2 40 Without a predicate right to assert, the plaintiffs' @ 1985(3) claim

had to fail.
We come now to the critical point. Read out of context, the language of
Novotny and Carpenters on these points could seem to say that all of
@ 1985(3) is merely remedial, even though those cases concerned only
@ 1985(3)'s first equal protection clause. The language from Novotny is as
follows: "Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely
provides a remedy .... "241 Carpenters says that "@ 1985(3) . . 'provides
no substantial rights itself to the class conspired against. The rights,
privileges, and immunities that @ 1985(3) vindicates must be found
elsewhere." 242 Some lower courts have read this language to mean that no
partof 1985(3) creates substantive rights. 243 If no part of @ 1985(3) created
substantive rights, then the support-or-advocacy clauses would not be
substantive. They would be remedial only. And no matter how compelling
a substantive interpretation of those clauses might be based on the statutory
language and history, clear statements to the contrary by the Supreme Court
would settle the question the other way-at least in the lower courts.
But any lower court inclined to think that the Supreme Court has deemed
the support-or-advocacy clauses remedial only should be fully deterred by a
long-standing fact about the Court's own jurisprudence-that Ex parte
Yarbrough treated the clauses as substantive. 2 44 Novotny and Carpenters
contain not a word suggesting that Ex parte Yarbrough is mistaken. There is
a straightforward reason why: Novotny and Carpenterswere not engaging
in the construction of the support-or-advocacy clauses at all. When the Court
in Novotny and Carpenterswrote that "@ 1985(3)" is remedial only, it used
"@ 1985(3)" as a shorthand for "the first clause of @ 1985(3)." To think
otherwise-to read the Court's statements as applying to all of @ 1985(3)is simply to misread the cases.
D. The Shorthand
An attentive reader of Novotny and Carpenterswould notice that the Court
in those cases pervasively deploys the shorthand of writing "@ 1985(3)" to
refer to the particular part of @ 1985(3) under discussion, rather than to the
the opening
Consider the following:
whole multiclause subsection.
239. Id. at 829-30.
240. Id. at 830, 833.
241. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 336, 372 (1979).
242. Carpenters,463 U.S. at 833 (citations omitted) (quoting Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372).
243. See Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 2004) (first citing Carpenters,
463 U.S. at 833; and then citing Novotny, 442 U.S. at 376); Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 661 (E.D. Va. 2019) (first citing Carpenters,463 U.S. at
833; and then citing Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372).
244. See supra Parts II.B, III.
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paragraph of Novotny says "[i]n the case now before us, we consider the
scope of 42 U.S.C. @ 1985(3),"245 not "we consider the scope of the first
clause of 42 U.S.C. @ 1985(3)," even though nothing in the case analyzes any
clause of @ 1985(3) beyond the first one. 24 6 Introducing the plaintiff's
complaint, Novotny says that "[h]e claimed damages under 42 U.S.C.
@ 1985(3), contending that he had been injured as the result of a conspiracy
to deprive him of equal protection of and equal privileges and immunities
under the laws." 247 The Court simply did not bother to write that the plaintiff
"claimed damages under the first clause of 42 U.S.C. @ 1985(3)," even
though the allegation clearly comes under that clause and no other. Novotny
describes Collins as the first Supreme Court case in which "[t]he provisions
of what is now @ 1985(3) were . . fully considered," 248 even though Collins
expressly limited its analysis to the first clause of @ 1985(3).249 Collins did
not consider the support-or-advocacy provisions at all, let alone consider
them "fully." And in describing the necessary elements of a @ 1985(3) claim,
Novotny invoked Griffin as follows:
The Court's opinion in Griffin discussed the following criteria for
measuring whether a complaint states a cause of action under § 1985(3):
"To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the
defendants did (1) 'conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another' (2) 'for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.' It must then
assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done,
'any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,' whereby
another was (4a) 'injured in his person of property' or (4b) 'deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States."'
Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides
a remedy for violation of the rights it designates. 25 0

This passage cannot possibly describe the requirements for causes of action
under all four clauses of @ 1985(3). The second criterion says that a
complaint under @ 1985(3) must allege a conspiracy to deprive someone of

245. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 368.
246. In much the same vein, Novotny describes § 1985(3) as "the surviving version of § 2

of the Civil Rights Act of 1871," even though § 1985(3) contains only a part of what survives
from section 2. Id. at 368. Novotny also describes Harris as having held "the criminal
provisions of the statute unconstitutional." Id. at 370-71 (citing United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1883)). In fact, Harris held only the criminal analogue of the equal protection
clauses invalid. See generally United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (adjudicating a
question arising under section 5519 of the Revised Statutes, which imposed criminal liability
only).
247. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 369 (citation omitted).
248. Id. at 371.

249. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 660 (1951) (specifying that the issue in that case
arose only under the language now codified as the first equal protection clause of § 1985(3)).
250. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971) (internal citation omitted)).
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equal protection. That is not a general requirement of complaints under
@ 1985(3). It is required only of complaints under the first clause of
@ 1985(3), which deals with equal protection. Nothing whatsoever is said in
this passage about the criteria for valid complaints under the other clauses of
@ 1985(3). The omission is understandable-in both Griffin and Novotny,
the Court adjudicated claims under clause one only. 25 1 But it should be clear,
and clear beyond doubt, that when the Novotny Court in the passage above
spoke of Griffin's discussion of "a cause of action under @ 1985(3),"252 it
could only mean "a cause of action under thefirst clause of @ 1985(3)." The
Court simply did not bother to write the sentence in the more specific and
more cumbersome way.
The language from Novotny that some courts have taken to mean that all
of @ 1985(3) is remedial only is, of course, the last line in the passage quoted
above-the one in which the Novotny Court returned to its own voice after
producing the text from Griffin. And it is clear, as just explained, that
throughout this discussion "@ 1985(3)" must refer only to that subsection's
first equal protection clause, rather than to the entire subsection. Seen in this
context, there is no reason to think that Novotny meant to say anything at all
about the remedial or substantive nature of parts of @ 1985(3) that were not
under discussion-including the support-or-advocacy clauses. As it did
throughout its opinion, the Court in its sentence about remedial legislation
used "@ 1985(3)" to mean "the portion of @ 1985(3) that is at issue in this
case.
The analysis is the same for Carpenters. Like the Novotny Court, the
CarpentersCourt had before it only a claim brought under the first clause of
@ 1985(3), alleging a conspiracy to deny equal protection. 253 But the Court
described the relevant cause of action as "made available by 42 U.S.C.
@ 1985(3),"254 rather than specifying that it was made available by the first
clause of @ 1985(3). Like Novotny, Carpentersquoted the long passage from
Griffin to establish the elements needed to make out a claim, thus stating that
"to make out a violation of @ 1985(3)," a plaintiff must show, inter alia, a
conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." 25 5 Again, the
showing that a conspiracy aims to deny equal protection is a required element
of a claim under the first clause of @ 1985(3). It is not required under the
support-or-advocacy clauses. So, the statement that this showing is a
required element "to make out a violation of @ 1985(3)"256 can only mean

251. See id. at 368-69 (stating that a claim arises from an alleged conspiracy to deny equal
protection by discriminating on the basis of sex); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 90
(1971) (stating that a claim arises from alleged conspiracy to deny equal protection by
inflicting injuries for reasons of racial animus).
252. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372.

253. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
827 (1983).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 829 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03).
256. Id. at 828.
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that it is required to make out a violation of the clause of § 1985(3) here
under discussion. Next, in analyzing whether animus against nonunion
employers fulfilled the class-based animus requirement established in
Griffin, Carpenters wrote of "the kind of animus that @ 1985(3) requires,"257
not "the kind of animus that the equal protection clauses of @1985(3)
require," even though the class-based animus requirement applies only to the
equal protection clauses. 258 So, when Carpenters (in partial reliance on
Novotny) wrote that "@ 1985(3) . . 'provides no substantial rights itself to
the class conspired against," 259 it should be understood to have used the term
"@ 1985(3)" in the same way it did throughout the opinion: to refer to the
statutory language under analysis, rather than to all of @ 1985(3).260
In short, to think that the description of "@ 1985(3)" in Novotny and
Carpenters as merely remedial describes all of @ 1985(3) is to think that two
Supreme Court opinions that persistently used "@ 1985(3)" as a shorthand for
"the first clause of @ 1985(3)" deviated from that use in order to say, without
explanation, that two clauses not under discussion, which have a different
constitutional basis from the clause that was under discussion, 26 1 which are
associated with the clause under discussion only by virtue of a recodification
that does not affect statutory meaning, 2 62 whose language is substantive, 263
and which cannot be plausibly understood as written to vindicate any
particular substantive rights specified elsewhere, 264 are remedial rather than
substantive-and sub silentio to overrule a prior Supreme Court case that
held to the contrary.265 That seems extravagant. It makes much more sense
to think that Novotny and Carpenters were simply using "@ 1985(3)" as a
shorthand for the clause under discussion.
To be sure, things would be clearer if the Court in Novotny and Carpenters
had taken care to write "the first clause of @ 1985(3)" rather than using the
shorthand. But courts do use this shorthand on a regular basis. For example,
Griffin described Harris as having construed "the exact criminal counterpart
of @ 1985(3),"266 even though the provision construed in Harris was the

257. Id. at 831.
258. Kushv. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726 (1983).
259. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833 (quoting Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979)).
260. Note too that the Carpenters language saying that "§ 1985(3)" provides no substantial

rights says that it provides no substantial rights "to the class conspired against." Id. And the
requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate a conspiracy that victimizes a class applies only in
actions under the first clauses of § 1985(3). See Kush, 460 U.S. at 726. Continuing the
thought, the next sentence in Carpenters says that "[t]he rights, privileges, and immunities
that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere." Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833. The
language of "rights, privileges, and immunities" again tracks the language of the first clause.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See
See
See
See
See

supra Part IIC.
supra Parts LB-C.
supra Part IIA.
supra Part IIB.
generally Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (upholding a prosecution

under section 5520 of the Revised Statutes and treating the provision as substantive
legislation).
266. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971).

188

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

criminal counterpart only of @ 1985(3)'s equal protection clauses, not the
criminal counterpart of all of @ 1985(3).267 Lower courts routinely speak of
"@ 1985(3)" as requiring a showing of class-based animus, 26 8 despite the
267. The Harris Court considered only the constitutionality of section 5519. The criminal
support-or-advocacy clauses were codified at section 5520. See id. at 104 ("The
constitutionality of § 1985(3) might once have appeared to have been settled adversely by
United States v. Harris, which held unconstitutional its criminal counterpart, then § 5519 of
the Revised Statutes." (citations omitted)).
268. See, e.g., Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015) (reading the class-

based animus requirement of Griffin as applying to "Section 1985(3)"); Keefe v. City of
Minneapolis, 785 F.3d 1216, 1224 (8th Cir. 2015) ("[P]er § 1985(3), [the plaintiff] is required
to show . . class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." (quoting McDonald v. City of
St. Paul, 679 F.3d 698, 706 (8th Cir. 2012))); McDonald v. City of St. Paul, 679 F.3d 698, 706

(8th Cir. 2012) ("To establish a conspiracy under § 1985(3), [the plaintiff] must prove ...
some 'class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."' (quoting Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993))); A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia,
655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (identifying "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" as an element of "a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)" (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47
F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995))); Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d

788, 802 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[T]he reach of section 1985(3) is limited to private conspiracies
predicated on 'racial, or perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'
(alteration in original) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997))); Estate of
Smithers ex rel. Norris v. City of Flint, 602 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2010) ("To sustain a claim

under section 1985(3), a claimant must prove both membership in a protected class and
discrimination on account of it. In other words, there must be proof of 'some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."' (quoting Bartell v. Lohiser, 215
F.3d 550, 559-60 (6th Cir. 2000))); Bryant v. Mil. Dep't, 597 F.3d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 2010)

(speaking of "the class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3)"); Atherton v. D.C. Off. of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("The statute does not apply to all conspiratorial

tortious interferences with the rights of others, but only those motivated by some class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus." (quoting Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 258 (D.C. Cir.
1987))); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 832 (6th Cir.

2007) ("A § 1985(3) complaint must 'allege both a conspiracy and some class-based
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. "' (quoting Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d
880, 886 (6th Cir. 1992))); Farberv. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating

that it is among "the requirements of a § 1985(3) claim[] that the conspirators be motivated by
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus"); Dornheimv. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 924 (8th
Cir. 2005) (" [T]o prove a private conspiracy in violation of .... § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
show, inter alia,... that some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action." (first, second, and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,
267-68 (1993))); Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Under

§ 1985(3), a conspiracy must be motivated by some 'racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus."' (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1993))); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2002) ("To bring a cause of action successfully under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
demonstrate a deprivation of a right motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus .... .' (quoting Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978
F.2d 1259, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 180 (2d Cir. 2002)

(characterizing Griffin as holding that "the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes the application
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) when there is 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus"' (quoting Grifin, 403 U.S. at 102)); Orin v. Barclay, 272
F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To prove aviolation of § 1985(3), [the plaintiff] must show

'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,

behind the conspirators' action."' (quoting

Grifin, 403 U.S. at 102)); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir.

2001) (stating that "[a]n indispensable element of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" (alteration in
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Supreme Court's clearly established rule that the class-based animus
requirement applies only in cases under @ 1985's equal protection clauses. 269
These courts are not purporting to contradict the settled proposition that
plaintiffs proceeding under the support-or-advocacy clauses need not show
class-based animus. They are simply not bothering to note that point; they
use "@ 1985(3)" as a shorthand to mean "the portion of @ 1985(3) now at
issue." Perhaps that usage is common because it is cumbersome to write "the
equal protection clauses of @ 1985(3)." Or perhaps it is common because the
vast majority of § 1985(3) cases arise under the first clause, such that judges
might by habit think of that first clause as tantamount to @ 1985(3) in general.
But whatever the reason for this judicial shorthand, it is standard practice.
Every indication, therefore, is that in writing that "@ 1985(3)" provides no
substantive rights, Carpenters and Novotny were merely engaging in the
common practice of using "@ 1985(3)" to refer only to the first clause, or
maybe both equal protection clauses, of that subsection. To read those cases
as holding or even suggesting that the support-or-advocacy clauses are
remedial legislation only is to misread them, plain and simple.
V.

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

A final note is in order about the practical implications of recognizing the
support-or-advocacy clauses as substantive legislation. Good judges are
mindful of the institutional limits under which courts operate, and federal
courts are supposed to be forums for only certain kinds of lawsuits. One
might accordingly wonder whether a federal cause of action for all
conspiracies to injure citizens because of their political views might bring
into federal court a great deal of litigation that does not really belong there.
Pointing to language in Carpenters, one defendant in recent @ 1985(3)
litigation has argued, in this vein, that federal courts should be loath to give
the support-or-advocacy clauses a substantive construction, lest they
overstep their appropriate role. 270 But on a bit of reflection, this concern
becomes insubstantial. Properly read, Carpenters has no bearing on this
question. As already explained, that case says nothing at all about the

original) (quoting Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000))); Horaist

v. Dr.'s Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 270 (5th Cir. 2001) ("To state a cognizable claim
under § 1985(3), [the plaintiff] must allege that . . . class-based discriminatory animus lay
behind the conspiracy."); Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The Supreme

Court has emphasized that § 1985(3) requires inter alia that a claimant establish 'some racial,
or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."' (quoting United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983))).

269. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726 (1983) (holding that a class-based animus
requirement applies only to clauses worded in terms of equal protection); cf United States v.
Butler, 25 F. Cas. 213, 223-24 (Waite, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. S.C. 1877) (No. 14,700)

(containing jury instructions from Chief Justice Morrison Waite, given while he was riding
circuit, that do not require a showing of class-based animus on charges brought under section
5520 of the Revised Statutes).
270. See Opening Brief in Support of Defendant Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss at 19, Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d
652 (E.D. Va. 2019) (No. 18 Civ. 484), ECF No. 23 [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
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support-or-advocacy clauses. 271 On the merits, it is true that a substantive
construction of the support-or-advocacy clauses would task the federal courts
with adjudicating claims that they would otherwise not adjudicate. But that
is true of any federal statute creating causes of action. In the present instance,
where the subject matter is federal elections, the involvement of the federal
judiciary is entirely appropriate.
The concern about the scope of cases potentially arising under the supportor-advocacy clauses stems mostly from the fact that under @ 1985, any person
who "is injured in his person or property" as a result of a covered conspiracy
is entitled to sue for damages. 272 That language casts a wide net. In Haddle
v. Garrison,273 the Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff can suffer an
injury sufficient to satisfy this statutory requirement even if he suffers no
harm that would count as an injury to a constitutionally recognized property
interest. 274 Albeit without so holding, the Court suggested that as a general
matter injuries traditionally recognized in common-law tort would count as
injuries under @ 1985.275
If any injury (or even most injuries) traditionally cognizable in tort
constitutes injury for the purposes of @ 1985, it follows that a broad range of
harms, some of them seemingly trivial, would suffice to support claims under
the support-or-advocacy clauses. Suppose, for example, that a United States
citizen who supports the Smith for Congress campaign places a yard sign
reading "Smith for Congress" on her front lawn. If two supporters of the
rival Jones campaign surreptitiously remove the sign, they would be liable in
damages under the second support-or-advocacy clause.
Quite
straightforwardly, the Jones supporters would be two people who had
conspired to injure a citizen in her property on account of her support or
advocacy for a candidate for Congress. Indeed, there would be two
cognizable injuries: one for trespass and one for the theft (or conversion) of
the sign, which was the plaintiff's property.
Few would contest that the Jones supporters behaved poorly in this
hypothetical case. But politics is not always a clean business, and one might
wonder whether the resources of the federal courts should be marshaled to
police the behavior described. Tort law is generally state law, and under the

271.
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See supra Part JV.C.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
525 U.S. 121 (1998).
Id. at 125.

275. Id. at 127. The Court was careful to note, however, that a § 1985 claim can proceed
even if the plaintiff in the action tries to recover on a cognate state law claim and does not
prevail. Id. at 127 n.4. More broadly, Haddle did not purport to confine the injury requirement

of § 1985 to common-law injury-it merely said that injuries cognizable at common-law
would likely be cognizable under § 1985. Finally, it should be clear that the Court in Haddle
had in mind a view of traditional common law in general, rather than suggesting that what
qualifies as injury under § 1985 is a function of the actual positive tort law of any given state
at the time a case arises. On the latter model, a state could nullify the effect of § 1985 by
legislating exceptions to its own tort law. A federal statute designed to protect federal rights
and federal governance from local actors bent on impeding federal governance is not sensibly
construed to permit that sort of work-around.
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Constitution, the responsibility for regulating elections-even federal
elections-lies as a default matter with the states. 276 In Carpenters, which
concerned a brawl over unionization, the Court noted its concern with the
prospect of overpolicing the rough-and-tumble of politics as follows:
[W]e find difficult the question whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for
every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or
do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means.
To accede to that view would go far toward making the federal courts, by
virtue of § 1985(3), the monitors of campaign tactics in both state and
federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to assume. 27 7

According to at least one set of litigants in recent @ 1985(3) cases, that
discussion in Carpentersreflects appropriate hesitation about constructions
of the support-or-advocacy clauses that would require federal courts to take
an aggressive posture toward policing political shenanigans. 27 8
In fact, however, neither the passage from Carpentersnor anything else
supports the idea that the support-or-advocacy clauses should be read
narrowly due to any concern about the proper role of the courts. Indeed, the
discussion in Carpentersis not about the support-or-advocacy clauses at all.
Carpenters arose only under the first equal protection clause of @ 1985(3)
and, as discussed earlier, its analysis of the statute looked at that clause
only. 279 When the Carpenters Court expressed hesitation about construing
"@ 1985(3)" to provide a remedy for political elbow throwing, it had in mind
the possibility that a political group's incursions on its rivals might be
deemed conspiracies to deny equal protection. Indeed, the Court's
expression of hesitancy about making federal courts "monitors of campaign
tactics in both state andfederal elections"2 80 is comprehensible only on the
understanding that the "difficult . .. question" 28 1 at issue was about the scope
of something in @ 1985(3) other than the support-or-advocacy clauses (i.e.,
the equal protection clauses). By their terms, the support-or-advocacy
clauses apply to federal elections only. So, a concern about the wisdom of
making federal courts monitor campaign tactics in state elections cannot be
a concern about the scope of the support-or-advocacy clauses.
Whatever validity the Carpenters concern might have in cases arising
under @ 1985(3)'s equal protection clauses, there are two reasons why it has
no application in the support-or-advocacy context. First, the concern in
Carpenters is best understood as a matter of federalism. As the Court's
language worrying about federal policing of "both state and federal
elections" 2 82 reflects, the Carpenters Court's concern was animated by the
specter of federal judicial involvement not in the limited world of federal
276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991).
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elections but in the far vaster universe of state elections as well. It is one
thing for a cause of action to be available in connection with congressional
and presidential elections and quite another for that cause of action to be
available in connection with every election for state legislature, city council,
school board, or water district commission. The idea that federal courts
would closely supervise every state and local election might well give the
Supreme Court pause. But the idea that federal courts have a mandate to
preserve fair play in federal elections raises no problems of federalism
whatsoever.
Second, to the extent that the CarpentersCourt's worry is understood not
in terms of federalism but simply in terms of the advisability of creating
causes of action to remedy political hijinks, it is a concern that makes much
more sense when a court is construing general statutory language than when
it applies a statute whose terms speak clearly to the specific question. The
claim in Carpentersarose under @ 1985(3)'s equal protection language. That
language is famously susceptible of many different constructions, and the
judiciary cannot avoid questions of structure and practicality when applying
it. In that setting, it makes sense for interpreters to contemplate questions
about the institutional capacity of courts. But the support-or-advocacy
clauses embody a judgment by Congress that the federal courts are to do a
particular thing, specifically, to entertain claims for damages by citizens who
are injured on account of the support or advocacy they give in favor of federal
political candidates. The statutory language leaves no room for asking
whether courts should do that. Indeed, if (per Carpenters) whether to read
the equal protection clauses of @ 1985(3) as directing the federal courts to
monitor campaign tactics in state elections is a "difficult . . . question," 2 83 the
question of whether the support-or-advocacyclauses direct the federal courts
to play that role in federal elections must be surpassingly easy.
It remains true that the complete apparatus of a case in federal court might
be a bit much to gin up every time Jones supporters swipe a "Smith for
Congress" sign. But this worry is more notional than real. Litigation is not
free, and a citizen whose only damage is the loss of a five-dollar placard is
unlikely to go through the effort of hunting down the thieves, retaining
counsel, and bringing suit. As is true under most federal statutes providing
private rights of action, the brute logic of resource calculation will keep most
small cases out of court. But when a case qualifying under the statutory
language does come before a federal court, adjudication in that court will do
no more than carry out Congress's instructions, given to a branch of the
federal government, to play a role in ensuring the integrity of federal
elections. For all these reasons, concerns about federalism furnish no reason
to give the support-or-advocacy clauses a narrower scope than their language
directs.
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CONCLUSION

The integrity of democratic elections must be actively protected rather than
taken for granted. Some threats to democratic elections in the next decade
will look like traditional threats, and some will be genuinely new. The statute
discussed in this Article is only one piece of the legal arsenal that will be
needed to place American elections on a more secure footing. Without new
legislation and a robust governmental commitment, the law we inherit from
previous times will not be enough. But the law we inherit does furnish useful
tools. The support-or-advocacy clauses are such tools. They should become
part of the standard tool kit of lawyers who seek to protect voters and
elections. And courts should recognize the function for which the clauses
were designed, giving them the full substantive content that the
Reconstruction Congress intended. This Article is intended to help courts
see their way through when the question comes before them.

